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Following the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, 
Tamil Nadu lost about 8,000 people and the 
lives and livelihoods of over 897,000 families 
were affected. In 2015, Chennai, the capital city 
of Tamil Nadu, was brought to a standstill by 
floods which killed 289 people, left 1,000 injured, 
and damaged property and livelihoods worth 
US$2.2 billion. These extreme events and others, 
such as the 2003–04 drought and the 2016 
cyclones, mobilised humanitarian action from a 
range of actors in Chennai. This study examines 
how humanitarian responses and post-disaster 
relocations fit into the wider development vision 
of large and fast-growing metropolises such 
as Chennai. 
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Executive summary
Humanitarian action in the context of city-wide or 
regional disasters is hard to accurately characterise and 
analyse. The scale of the problem, the widespread and 
ad hoc nature of responses, and the relatively transient 
character of many of these actions, make it difficult 
to fully grasp and analyse humanitarian interventions 
and their implications. Yet, in the emerging context of 
recurrent, intensifying, and intersecting disasters in the 
city of Chennai, and the fact that some of these actions 
may have significant medium- or long-term effects on 
socioeconomic and ecological trajectories of the city, 
understanding the nature and implications of such 
actions is pertinent. Therefore, with this research, we set 
out to understand the socioeconomic, environmental, 
and political outcomes of these humanitarian actions in 
the medium and long term.
While the state continues to figure as the primary 
institution responsible for disaster response and 
rehabilitation, disasters have typically witnessed a 
vast mobilisation of many non-state actors. There is an 
outpouring of humanitarian voluntarism, bringing a large 
amount of resources in various forms – skills, human 
resources, materials and funds – into play. These non-
governmental resources sometimes exceed the state’s 
resources and capacities. Government agencies are 
therefore seen depending on such actors for response 
activities. In 2015, Chennai, the capital city of Tamil 
Nadu, was brought to a standstill by floods which killed 
289 people, left 1,000 injured, and damaged property 
and livelihoods worth US$2.2 billion (SwissRe, 2016). 
Chennai’s experience showed that in the absence 
of readily available institutional platforms to absorb 
and channel these energies and motives, large-scale 
voluntarism can pose problems for humanitarian 
intervention at the aggregate level. 
Extreme events invite a moment of assessment. They are 
inevitably followed by evaluations in various public fora – 
from the press to formal and informal public discussions 
– of rescue and relief efforts and the role of various 
actors. The emotional, and often traumatic, registers 
of the experience make these moments stick in public 
memory. Thus, public image-building becomes a central 
element of humanitarian efforts, and of the discourses 
that follow. In this and other ways, interventions during 
disasters may bring collateral benefits of different kinds 
for all actors. Like state agencies, NGOs also gain 
mileage from the visibility of their outreach efforts. Such 
times also often enable NGOs to deepen engagement 
with assisted communities, sometimes altering the 
character of the NGO’s ongoing work. State agencies 
access new sources of funds and get the opportunity 
to build their capacity in critical areas. It is evident 
that relationships among different actors also get 
built, although the sustainability of such relationships 
is questionable. Many individuals who witness havoc 
at such scale also often find themselves moving on 
new paths.
Not surprisingly, then, there is a strong element 
of ‘everybody loves a disaster’.1 Disasters provide 
opportunity for various agendas to be furthered. 
Although it is not always a case of misplaced intentions, 
there are often veiled agendas behind humanitarian 
action. Our study found that disasters in Chennai 
provided Tamil Nadu an opportunity to construct a 
discourse of responsiveness and good governance. 
While these discourses in some instances fed into 
actions that seemed to strengthen the city’s resilience, 
they also served to justify and support prior agendas 
of the state. As the study found, post-flood governance 
discourses institutionalised technical parameters 
of vulnerability, pushed towards a formalisation of 
urbanisation processes including stricter implementation 
of building codes and regulations, and justified 
action against encroachments. However, the state’s 
business-as-usual repertoire of selectively defining 
encroachments as referring only to dwellings of the 
urban poor, with a continued failure to act against 
elite encroachments, continued during post-disaster 
response. Extreme events have long been used as an 
1 Adapted from the title of P Sainath’s book ‘Everybody loves a good drought’, which made a similar point, that extreme events provide opportunities for various 
actors to leverage a perceived crisis for self-interested gains (Sainath, 2000).
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entry point for reshaping agendas related to land and 
development. They have been used to justify relocating 
poor people and clear squatter encroachments 
from lands that the state plans to allocate to more 
lucrative purposes. This continued unchanged in post-
disaster Chennai.
Temporal aspects are also important in distinguishing 
extreme events and their effects. Duration, timing, 
phasing, and the relationships between short- and 
long-term actions are important. Immediate actions 
have a different valence than those taken over a longer 
term, but in either condition, the actions must ‘do no 
harm’ at the very least. However, this study found that 
certain interventions after disaster tend to have a ratchet 
effect. The manner of distribution of humanitarian 
assistance often altered local economies and social 
relations by introducing resources of inappropriate scale 
or type. We also collected instances of post-disaster 
responses undermining the dignity and autonomy of 
vulnerable communities. 
Differing value systems among humanitarian and 
development actors shape decisions for development 
as well as disaster preparedness, and carry outcomes 
for the city’s ecological and social systems, what and 
who gets prioritised, and whose agenda is furthered. In 
the aftermath of disasters, metrics of value and worth 
get redefined, and decisions about what stays in the city 
and what is removed become particularly crucial. 
Long-term impLications of humanitarian responses | The case of chennai
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1 
Introduction
1.1 Humanitarian action in 
India and its implications 
for structural risks 
The government of India uses the terms ‘humanitarian 
assistance’ or ‘disaster relief’ to refer to activities that 
address human suffering caused by natural disasters 
like cyclones, droughts, earthquakes or floods (Meier 
and Murthy, 2011). Earthquakes, drought, floods 
and cyclones are some of the major disasters across 
India in the last two decades. While effective disaster 
management practices helped minimise loss of life in 
Odisha and Andhra Pradesh in 2013 post-cyclones, 
failure to respond to early warnings and prepare for 
floods in Uttarakhand (2013), Kashmir (2014) and 
Chennai (2015) have raised serious concerns about the 
effectiveness of India’s disaster management system 
(Menon, 2016). 
In India, states hold primary responsibility for disaster 
management. The central government provides 
assistance in terms of financial support and military 
forces on request. While a central audit of flood 
management systems reveals that flood planning, 
preparedness and early warning systems are 
insufficient, delayed, non-integrated or non-functional in 
most states (CAG, 2017), there is still limited research 
done on the long-term implications of post-disaster 
response actions undertaken by the government as well 
as other actors. 
Although civil society and humanitarian agencies have 
significant contributions post-disaster, in India their 
role is largely complementary and the state, along with 
national governments and military forces, are the biggest 
responders to most emergencies (Falcao, 2012). Civil 
societies are under-utilised in the event of a disaster, 
due to their complex relationships with the government 
and the absence of standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) for local and international NGOs to follow up 
and coordinate with the state post-disaster (Price and 
Bhatt, 2009). 
Like the post-flood situation in Chennai, an outpouring 
of inappropriate and often unwanted relief is reported 
by many NGOs coordinating relief distribution, “Many 
clothes that were provided following the tsunami were 
later shipped on to victims of other disasters, including 
the 2005 Gujarat floods. This recurred in the 2008 
Bihar floods, leading the chief minister to ask for relief 
supplies to be halted because of a lack of storage 
capacity in the state” (Price and Bhatt, 2009). Similarly, 
oversupply of Fibre Reinforced Plastic (FRP) boats by 
various agencies post-tsunami in Tamil Nadu resulted 
in an increased number of boats and overfishing, 
leading to an environmental disaster (Barenstein and 
Iyengar, 2010; UN et al., 2006). Instead of using the 
disaster as an opportunity to train fishermen in more 
sustainable livelihoods, it morphed into a competition 
to supply unsustainable boats (Price and Bhatt, 2009). 
IFRC’s World Disaster Report (2015) suggests that 
strengthening the role of local actors may address 
the challenges of humanitarian aid, such as shrinking 
access, fragmentation and incoherency in operations, 
IIED WorkIng papEr
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and the gaps between response, recovery and 
development (IFRC, 2015). 
Geophysical calamities such as earthquakes have 
attracted large reconstruction programmes and 
funds, whereas frequent events such as floods and 
cyclones in Bihar, Assam, and Andhra Pradesh, have 
not initiated post-disaster reconstruction programmes 
at scale (Barenstein and Iyengar, 2010; Thiruppugazh, 
2014). The post-tsunami rehabilitation phase was not 
as successful as the relief phase and many affected 
families continued to live in temporary shelters even 
two years after the event (Price and Bhatt, 2009; UN 
et al., 2006). 
Once the response and relief phase ends, the task of 
reconstruction and rehabilitation (as part of the recovery 
process) lies with the government. The reconstruction 
process takes a long time and it is challenging for 
the government to make it a consistent development 
opportunity (Shaw, 2006) and thereby to build resilient 
communities (Thiruppugazh, 2014). A CARE (2016) 
study on long-term impacts of shelter projects found 
more focus on delivering houses and completing 
projects than on beneficiary participation and quality 
of work. Meanwhile, the provision of durable housing, 
which is safe and dignified, can reduce future disaster 
risk, provide security, and allow beneficiaries to focus on 
other priorities. However, implementing reconstruction 
projects without addressing livelihood issues has been 
largely unsuccessful because the poorest and most 
vulnerable were unable to utilise provided housing since 
they lacked economic resources to sustain themselves 
(CARE, 2016). 
Often, relocated families are forced to survive by 
migrating because of delays or shortfalls in the 
provision of government housing and job opportunities 
(Development Initiatives, 2016; Menon, 2016). The 
loss of livelihoods among the unorganised sector 
due to natural disasters is rarely accounted for 
nor compensated (Menon, 2016). Post-disaster 
compensation is linked to either land or house titles; the 
poor and vulnerable, many of whom do not have a title, 
are often denied compensation. 
Jigyasu (2002) points out that the existing development 
processes and post-disaster rehabilitation is highly 
interlinked because existing societal vulnerabilities 
shape the rehabilitation process post disasters. 
Additionally, new vulnerabilities are created because 
of the rehabilitation process itself. In Tamil Nadu, Dalits 
and women were neglected in the post-tsunami relief 
and response by the state and the NGOs. Relief was 
distributed on the basis of caste; Dalits were denied 
relief by the fishing and other upper caste communities 
as there were not many deaths in the Dalit communities 
(Banerjee and Chaudhury, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 
2005; Price and Bhatt, 2009; Srinivasan and Nagaraj, 
2007). This continued in the reconstruction phase 
where some rich and powerful castes joined hands to 
buy land for relocation with Dalits having no option but 
to stay back (Barenstein and Iyengar, 2010). 
Experiences and learning from past disasters are 
often ignored. Successful outcomes of owner-driven 
reconstruction approaches after the Gujarat earthquake 
were not followed after the Indian Ocean tsunami 
or the Kashmir earthquake (Barenstein and Iyengar, 
2010). The agency-driven construction approach 
after the tsunami only aimed at delivering houses and 
spending allotted funds. In the process, existing villages, 
including houses that weren’t damaged in the tsunami, 
were demolished to construct new settlements as the 
agencies could not find land for relocation (Barenstein 
and Iyengar, 2010). 
With this research, we set out to understand the long-
term implications of post-disaster humanitarian action on 
people and the cities at large. We aimed to recognise 
the various humanitarian actors, and the context and 
modes through which they act. We also aimed to 
recognise the existing vulnerabilities, both before 
and due to the disasters, and whether the actions 
undertaken indeed responded to these vulnerabilities. 
1.2 Post-disaster housing 
provisions
There seems to be a significant challenge faced 
by government agencies in India in distinguishing 
between the short-term response phase and longer-
term rehabilitation. Rehabilitation must be undertaken 
as part of a long-term recovery process following 
detailed socioeconomic and risk assessments, 
with relevant monitoring frameworks in place. 
But undertaking resettlement within a short time 
after the disaster is unable to address underlying 
inequalities or vulnerabilities that may have caused 
the losses. Such ‘quick-fix responses’ can have poor 
developmental outcomes. 
Much of the development literature defines housing as 
not just a shelter or dwelling unit (ie a physical space 
occupied by one or more households), but as a ‘viable’ 
interaction of this physical asset with the surrounding 
system. Viability of housing could be further dependent 
on achieving access to socioeconomic services, 
including livelihood opportunities, tenure security, 
capacity for the house to be an economic asset, 
affordability, and adequacy to needs (Bhan, Anand 
et al. 2014).
Long-term impLications of humanitarian responses | The case of chennai
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Yet, post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction are 
often done under urgency and many aspects of viable 
housing tend to get overlooked. Providing housing 
tends to only reduce physical vulnerabilities, and 
potentially embeds other negative risks pertaining to the 
socioeconomic needs or environmental dependencies 
of people and city systems. 
Housing provision is often done in coordination with 
or led by various government departments involved in 
delivering the physical asset (a house), land, and the 
associated services (water, electricity, sewage disposal) 
at various scales (national, state, and local). These post-
disaster housing provisions are often made in line with 
an existing vision, plan, and strategy for meeting housing 
needs. While this could be advantageous in post-
disaster situations when urgent housing is required, 
various implementation challenges tend to negatively 
affect the outcomes (Col, 2007). 
Lack of coordination between agencies in delivering 
suitable and viable housing is well documented across 
development and disaster response literature (Rwomire, 
2001, Begum, 2015, Yazdani et al., 2015). Challenges 
related to land tenure, which are recognised as 
central to reducing vulnerabilities in the long term, also 
continue to exist (Caron et al., 2014). Existing plans and 
strategies may or may not be suitable for the affected 
population or meet new needs created after the crisis. 
Yet, providing physical support, such as housing, which 
is visible, measurable, and clearly demonstrates post-
disaster action, often garners more political mileage 
than longer, more holistic rehabilitation. 
1.3 Chennai as a site of 
multiple hazards and rapid 
development 
Chennai faces multiple hazards. It faces coastal flooding 
due to extreme storm surges and cyclones and is 
classified as a ‘very high damage risk zone’ (GoTN, 
2014). In 2004, a tsunami that hit Tamil Nadu killed 
nearly 8,000 people and affected more than 1 million 
people. Most recently, Chennai was among the most 
affected regions after the heavy rains in December 2015 
that led to severe floods in Tamil Nadu. Many lives were 
lost, over 6 million people were affected, and 1.5 million 
houses were damaged.
The city also has seen a high incidence of flooding 
with significant flooding events recurring since 2005. 
However, analysis of meteorological data in Chennai 
over the past 200 years does not show any significant 
trend in precipitation amounts (Drescher et al., 2007). 
This points to the fact that rainfall amount has remained 
the same, and it is the increased built-up area over 
natural drainage channels, and wetland fragmentation 
and degradation that are leading to increased 
flood incidence. 
Chennai also has a history of recurrent water shortages 
(GoTN, 2014, Srinivasan, 2008, Janakarajan et al., 
2007). In 2003–04, it suffered from a severe drought 
stemming from poor monsoonal rains. This led to a drop 
of groundwater by seven to eight metres, the shutting 
down of the city’s piped water supply, the complete 
drying out of local reservoirs, and reports of rioting 
in informal settlements (Thomas, 2013; Srinivasan, 
2008). Adaptive action during and after the drought was 
either individual (people drew water from private wells, 
shifted to labour intensive sources of gathering water, 
reduced water use, among others) or from the private 
or informal sector (water tankers, use of bottled water). 
State-led responses included supply augmentation 
by Chennai Metrowater by hiring agricultural wells in 
peri-urban areas, setting up pipes and sumps, and 
passing the rainwater harvesting regulation, which made 
capturing rooftop rainwater mandatory in every house2 
(Thomas, 2013).
Climate change is projected to exacerbate existing risks 
and expose vulnerable populations to more erratic and 
extreme rainfall and temperature. Chennai is projected 
to see an increase in maximum temperature by 1oC 
and a 9 per cent decrease in average annual rainfall by 
2040 (GoTN, 2014). Taken together, these projections 
indicate that the city is going to see hotter and drier 
seasons in the future with direct implications on drought 
incidence and severity. Although the frequency of 
cyclones hitting the Tamil Nadu coast is projected to 
decrease, the intensity (measured through wind speed) 
may increase (MoEF, 2010). Sea level rise along the 
Chennai coast is projected to increase by 0.37mm/year, 
which is equivalent to a change of 0.10 feet in 100 years 
(GoTN, 2014).
Chennai’s population increased from 1.7 million in 
1961 to 7.1 million in 2011. This rapid urbanisation 
and population growth are putting pressure on 
Chennai’s ecological, infrastructural, and social systems 
(Vencatesan et al., 2014; Janakarajan et al., 2007). A 
growing IT-industry and large-scale labour migration 
intersecting with issues of inadequate housing, growing 
unemployment, water shortages, and insufficient waste 
disposal, are resulting in multi-dimensional vulnerabilities 
(GoTN, 2014; Drescher et al., 2007). 
Chennai is expected to urbanise at, potentially, an 
exponential rate, with an increasing investment pumped 
to fuel the rhetoric of the smart city, as well as provide 
for the needs of its growing population. The city needs 
2 For more information, visit www.chennaimetrowater.com
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space, but it needs to realise that any encroachment 
into ecologically sensitive zones would only increase 
the city’s vulnerability to natural hazards like urban 
floods and water scarcity, apart from the more severe 
events like a tsunami or the gradual increase in sea 
water levels due to anthropogenic climate change. 
Given that Chennai is a site exposed to multiple risks 
(flooding, cyclones, tsunami, and water scarcity), 
humanitarian action from various actors presents itself 
as a rich case to understand how these dynamics come 
together to shape the city’s development trajectory and 
multidimensional vulnerability.
1.4 A historical overview of 
housing and slum clearance 
in Chennai 
Chennai, formerly Madras, has often been dubbed a city 
of slums. Well into the twentieth century it was marked 
among Indian cities for its large concentration of Dalit 
(formerly ‘untouchable’) hamlets. These settlements, 
known as paracheris, had established themselves from 
the 18th century on the edges of agricultural villages 
and small urban centres that were incorporated into 
Madras city when its first boundary was drawn in 1789 
(Neild, 1979; Ahuja, 2001). The paracheris, which 
housed the majority of the city’s unskilled labour force 
and a growing stream of low-caste migrants from the 
hinterlands, occupied these lands, linking the scattered 
settlements of the region into a coherent urban space. 
In the 1920s and 30s, as depressed agrarian conditions 
in the rural hinterlands brought landless agricultural 
labourers in large numbers to Madras, census 
figures record surges of population growth, yielding 
decadal growth rates of 24 per cent and 20 per cent 
respectively (Office of the Census Commissioner, 
1961). Accompanying this was a marked spread of 
slums, which inspired many institutional developments. 
In 1946, the City Improvement Trust (CIT) was formed 
in Madras as a statutory body under the CIT Act of 
1945, with a mandate to decongest urban areas, clear 
slums, demolish old buildings, lay out streets and parks, 
and acquire lands for these purposes (GoI, 2006). 
Until 1951, slum clearance largely meant shifting slums 
to the outskirts of or outside the city (ibid). In 1952, 
however, a housing advisory committee constituted 
by the government of Madras recommended a shift 
from clearance to ‘improvement’. A slum improvement 
scheme was drafted on the principle of ameliorating 
conditions in existing slums by providing proper layouts 
and basic amenities. Surplus families were to be 
rehoused in sites that would be acquired and developed 
not far from their workplaces (ibid.). In 1954, the Madras 
Slum Acquisition of Land Act (1954) was passed to 
enable the government to acquire and develop slum 
lands. Through the 1950s, the CIT acquired large tracts 
of land around the city and attempted to build their way 
out of the housing shortage by constructing tenements 
and single-room houses for slum dwellers with state 
government funds (Venkat and Subadevan, 2015). 
In 1961, the Tamil Nadu Housing Board (TNHB) was 
established by the state government, absorbing the CIT 
that had hitherto functioned as part of the Corporation 
of Madras. The TNHB was mandated to provide a 
solution to the looming housing crisis by developing 
housing for all classes of the population. However, it 
fell severely short of its targets in numbers of dwelling 
units (MIDS, 2011). By 1961, when the Census of India 
conducted a special study of slums in Madras city, there 
were nearly 100,000 families living in 548 slums, of 
which a fifth were located on the coast or on the banks 
of waterways (Office of the Census Commissioner, 
1961; GoI, 2006). 
The slum dwellers of Madras became a political 
constituency with the rise of the regional party Dravida 
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), which won elections to 
the municipal corporation of Madras in 1962 and to 
the state legislature in 1967. Following on its campaign 
promises of providing concrete homes for slum 
dwellers, the DMK government began to implement a 
radical housing agenda by reconstituting the institutional 
framework for housing (Venkat and Subadevan, 2015). 
A key moment in the city’s history of slum clearance 
was the formation of the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance 
Board (TNSCB) in 1971, under the Tamil Nadu Slum 
Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1970. The 
Act protected slum dwellers from arbitrary evictions 
and provided for security of tenure and improvements 
in living conditions. From this point on, slum-clearance 
initiatives in Chennai can be broadly categorised into 
four types that followed a chronological sequence 
(Coelho et al., 2015).
In the 1970s, the TNSCB predominantly constructed 
in situ multi-storeyed tenements to rehouse slum 
dwellers, aiming to free Madras of slums in seven years 
by constructing 20,000 tenements a year (Raman, 
2011). However, as elsewhere across the world, this 
approach had limited success due to its high costs, 
heavy dependence on state funding, and the tendency 
for the benefits to be captured by powerful or politically 
connected households. By 1981, only 17 per cent of the 
0.22 million households of slum dwellers in Madras had 
been rehoused in tenements (ibid.).
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In the late 70s and 80s, the state’s policies shifted 
from tenement construction to in situ slum upgrading 
and sites-and-services (S&S) schemes, implemented 
in Chennai under the World Bank-funded Madras 
Urban Development Projects (MUDP) I and II. 
Influenced by John Turner’s writings on Peru, and by 
concerns of financial sustainability and replicability of 
its interventions, the Bank advocated for approaches 
that would allow slum dwellers to invest in improving 
their own housing once provided with tenure security, 
adequate infrastructure, and low-interest credit. MUDP I 
and II made significant advances in providing affordable 
shelter to the urban poor, together providing plots or 
improved slums for 76,000 slum households over 10 to 
12 years (Pugh, 1990). 
But by the mid-1990s, evictions and the resettlement 
of slum dwellers in tenements outside the city had 
surfaced again, this time through well-funded and mass-
scale programmes. Growing pressures on urban land as 
real estate and for advanced infrastructure, an emerging 
emphasis on environmental improvements including 
waterways restoration and city beautification projects, 
and the availability of large-scale funding through 
projects like the Tamil Nadu Urban Development Project 
(TNUDP) and the JNNURM, contributed to this shift. 
Since 2000, over 50,000 resettlement tenements have 
been built by the government of Tamil Nadu (GoTN) 
in the southern outskirts of Chennai alone. Although 
the JNNURM’s policy guidelines advocated in-situ 
slum upgrading as the preferred approach, large 
amounts of funds received under its Basic Services 
for the Urban Poor (BSUP) component were spent 
by the GoTN on building resettlement tenements on 
urban peripheries, mostly on lands reclaimed from 
marshlands and floodplains (details in Table 1, Section 
3.3.2). The TNSCB’s role had shifted from one of 
protecting slum dwellers from evictions and improving 
their living conditions to that of releasing slum lands for 
‘development purposes’. By late 2015, many of these 
housing units were laying vacant, awaiting the eviction 
of slum dwellers from the city. This forms the backdrop 
for the resettlement drives that have routinely followed 
disasters in Chennai since the 1990s. 
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2 
Research framework
2.1 Research questions
The key research question we asked is, “What are the 
long-term risk implications of post-disaster humanitarian 
action?” We unpacked this further in the following sub-
questions: 
1) What are the varied modes through which 
humanitarian actors intervene in a disaster, and what 
do disasters reveal about the capacities, agendas, 
and compulsions of different actors? 
2) What are the existing vulnerabilities before and due 
to the disasters, prior to any humanitarian action?
3) What are the socioeconomic, environmental, and 
political outcomes of these humanitarian actions in 
the medium and long term, and is there a mismatch 
between the existing vulnerabilities from question no. 
2 and the actions taken?
4) What are the insights and lessons in terms of 
innovations and gaps in humanitarian interventions 
during and after disasters?
2.2 Scope of the study 
In this study, we examine humanitarian action in Chennai 
city. We focus on extreme events post-2000 that 
affected Chennai: the 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami and 
the 2015 heavy rainfall and flooding events. We briefly 
talk about 2016 Cyclone Vardha, since it occurred 
during the research was underway, but understanding 
long-term implications of the actions taken during this is 
outside the scope of this research. We also recognise 
the extreme water scarcity experienced in the city in 
2002, but this was not declared as a disaster, and 
therefore there was no active humanitarian action 
undertaken. We do however, through this study, attempt 
to understand the implications of humanitarian action 
on the potentially increasing risk of water scarcity in the 
city. Among humanitarian actors, we focus on action by 
the government and how it interfaces with other actors, 
such as local civil society workers and activists. The 
research examines trends and action taken in Chennai 
as a whole, with a specific focus on the relocation sites 
of Kannaginagar, Semmencherry and Perumbakkam, 
all three of which are located within the wetland of 
Pallikarnai marsh (See Map 1).
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2.3 Research methods and 
tools 
This study combined a use of primary and secondary 
research methods. Secondary research included: 
1. Literature review: We reviewed literature covering 
government documents, newspaper articles related 
to the two disasters of interest, NGO reports on 
humanitarian action, peer-reviewed publications on 
conceptualising risk, and past cases of humanitarian 
action. We also conducted a detailed policy review 
to map key stakeholders and their roles pre and 
post event, charted policy evolution around risk 
management post extreme events, and analysed if 
urban planning in Chennai includes a multi-hazard, 
area-based approach to disaster management. 
2. Spatial analysis: We used spatial analysis to 
understand Chennai’s urbanisation pattern and how 
this has shaped land use and land cover change, 
imperviousness, and relocation locations. The 
built-up land cover was extracted using supervised 
classification of Landsat imagery for the years 1996, 
2001 (Landsat 5 TM), and 2016 (Landsat 8 OLI) 
(Sivakumar, Chatterji et al. 2016). Shuttle Radar 
Topography Mission (SRTM) 90m Digital Elevation 
Model (DEM) was used to visualise the terrain 
and to understand the natural drainage patterns 
(Jarvis, Reuter et al. 2008). Locations of water 
bodies, Pallikarnai Marsh boundaries, IT corridor, 
groundwater aquifer recharge zones, and proposed 
locations for housing projects were extracted from 
the CMDA Master Plan 2026. The mapping of 
housing sites was carried out using information 
Map 1: Ground elevation, water bodies and drainage networks along with disaster-affected sites and resettlement sites
Source: IIHS Analysis, 2017; CGIAR-CSI SRTM, 2009; 
CMDA Masterplan, 2026 (CMDA, 2008); OpenStreetMap 
Contributors, 2017.
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from government and media reports, and on-ground 
cross-referencing. 
We used primary data to understand how multiple 
actors address and plan for current and future risks and 
whether these also address structural vulnerabilities and 
risk from hazards in an integrated manner.
1. Key informant interviews (KIIs): We conducted 
a total of 20 KIIs (Appendix 2), of which eight 
were with government officials working in relevant 
departments, such as disaster management, 
housing, urban development, and revenue 
department. Four KIIs were conducted with 
academics and activists working on issues of urban 
planning, risk management, hazard studies, and 
relevant environmental problems such as water 
scarcity and wetland deterioration. Eight interviews 
were conducted with humanitarian actors, such 
as NGOs providing post-disaster relief and citizen 
activists. These key informants (KIs) were identified 
as important actors based on literature reviews and 
snowballing from informants. 
2. Semi-structured household interviews (SSIs): 
To explore the effectiveness of humanitarian action 
in the short and long term, we conducted semi-
structured interviews with 55 households across 
the three research sites (Appendix 1). Households 
were chosen to represent humanitarian action after 
relocation following the tsunami in 2002 and after 
the flood in 2015. Within each location, households 
were chosen based on type of relocation package 
provided (based on housing type), and most 
importantly, willingness of participants to give 45 to 
60 minutes of their time. Table A1 in Appendix 1 lists 
the study neighbourhoods, and the labels used for 
each. These labels, along with an acronym for the 
interviewee, are used throughout the report to refer 
to the semi-structured interviews (SSIs) with the 
specific household (eg KNG/AIB/01 stands for an 
SSI with the first household interviewed in Kannagi 
Nagar by Aishwarya Balasubramanian).
3. Stakeholder consultations: Multi-stakeholder 
consultations were organised before and after the 
primary data collection phase. Participants included 
government officials, actors from civil society, 
researchers, and activists. The first consultation 
was organised around themes such as disaster 
management for slow and rapid onset disasters, 
government action in the form of relocation and 
housing provision, short-term implications on lives, 
livelihoods and infrastructure, long-term implications 
on ecosystem functioning, social vulnerability and 
development trajectories. The second consultation 
was used as a platform to present initial findings 
from our study and to collectively engage with 
issues of trade-offs involved in decisions of urban 
planning in general and its implications for social 
vulnerability and humanitarian action, to identify 
what works and what doesn’t, and to construct a 
common understanding of how multiple actors can 
work together. 
2.4 Methodological 
challenges and resolutions
Studying the implications of past events and actions 
after ten years of the event is ridden with significant 
challenges of recall and biases of reporting (Singh, 
2014). Researchers have documented that when 
it comes to disaster recall, human cognition gives 
more weighting to ‘impressionable’ events (Ferrier 
and Haque, 2003) and the immediate often takes 
precedence over the past (Hertwig et al., 2004). This 
also leads to people over-reporting rare, high-impact 
events such as floods and cyclones while downplaying 
more commonly occurring but low-impact slow-onset 
phenomenon such as drought (Singh, 2014). To 
overcome such biases, we supplemented the enquiry 
with a review of literature on past events in Chennai as 
well as interviews with key informants from government, 
civil society, and academia (Appendix 2), and used 
the events they mentioned as probes for the household-
level SSIs. In addition to recall bias, there could also 
be some implications of political bias involved, which 
we have tried to resolve by getting multiple voices 
from different types of actors. There may also be a 
researcher bias, considering we had a small team 
conducting primary study and analysis, but we have 
tried to remain as factual as possible using quotes from 
the KIIs and SSIs to arrive at conclusions. 
Since the research was dealing with risk management in 
post-disaster situations, care was taken to be sensitive 
to any potential mental trauma that the respondents 
could face while recounting situations of post-event 
loss. Wherever questions caused visible discomfort, 
they were dropped and care was taken to change the 
line of enquiry. The team followed ethical protocols 
(Diener and Crandall 1978) and received clearance 
from the IIHS Ethics Committee prior to fieldwork.
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3 
Research findings
3.1 Mapping humanitarian 
actors in Chennai
What are the varied modes through which 
humanitarian actors intervene in a disaster, and 
what do disasters reveal about the capacities, 
agendas, and compulsions of different actors? 
We used primary and secondary methods to map 
the actors involved in humanitarian actions during the 
tsunami and the 2015 floods. Four broad categories 
were identified: 
1. Multiple government agencies, some of which, eg 
the state revenue department and the Chennai 
Corporation, were directly responsible for providing 
flood relief, and several others that were not directly 
responsible yet which intervened actively in their 
respective domains, eg the state and municipal 
health departments, police, and fire services.
2. A range of civil society groups, from established 
NGOs to resident welfare associations, community-
based organisations (CBOs), professional 
associations, and trade unions. 
3. Corporate bodies and private companies, which in 
many cases, saw their staff and managers venture 
out personally to provide direct assistance after the 
floods, but mostly reached out through NGOs to 
target their efforts effectively.
4. Individuals who volunteered to assist in humanitarian 
efforts.
3.1.1 Government actors
3.1.1.1 Post-disaster immediate relief
The Chennai Corporation is the principal actor in 
disaster management for the city. At the metropolitan 
level, the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority 
(CMDA) is the policy and advisory agency for disaster 
management. Its second master plan carries a chapter 
on disasters, articulating disaster management and 
mitigation policies and strategies to be followed by 
local bodies. At the state level, policy bodies include 
the state disaster management authority, headed by 
the chief minister and established in 2005, with the 
revenue department and district collectors being key 
agencies responsible for disaster management and 
relief. Legally, a government institution is supposed to 
have a disaster management cell, with a person heading 
it, whose role would be to educate people on how to 
handle disasters. However, according to local disaster 
management experts, most departments are unaware of 
this requirement.
In practice, government agencies have developed a 
standard protocol to deal with what they perceive as 
a fairly predictable pattern of climate events that have 
the potential to intensify into disasters. Storms and 
floods typically occur with the erratic northeast (NE) 
monsoons that begin in October, and droughts are 
caused by inadequate rainfall during this time, although 
they typically manifest by the summer months, between 
April and June, of the following year. This pattern 
forms the framework for the disaster management 
strategies of the city. While the city corporation does 
not have a dedicated department or personnel for 
disaster response, it allocates a part of its machinery 
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for preparedness and response in the months leading 
up to the NE monsoons. Standard preparations in this 
period include desilting drainage channels and cleaning 
out canals and waterways in the city. However, given the 
impacts of the 2015 floods in Chennai, the effectiveness 
of these basic measures, even in years of normal rainfall, 
is questionable, and deep-rooted environmental issues 
may need more attention. 
In terms of the state’s role in relief actions during and 
immediately after the 2015 floods, a mixed picture 
emerged. Many respondents commented that the 
government was absent during the initial days of the 
floods. When they did move into action, they did not 
cover all regions evenly. Respondents from NGOs noted 
that certain pockets within the city, particularly some of 
the more remote and vulnerable areas (eg Korukkupet) 
remained underserved. 
It is important, however, to disaggregate government 
agencies in terms of their responses and capacities. 
Some government agencies were slower than others in 
response. The City Corporation responded efficiently 
and promptly, deploying rescue efforts and setting 
up relief camps. During the relief and rescue period, 
the corporation also called for a meeting with NGOs 
to streamline relief efforts, identify synergies and 
overlaps, and coordinate action. However, state-level 
bodies such as the revenue department and SDMA 
were largely missing in the crucial phase just after the 
disaster. The National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) 
also reportedly arrived only four days after the floods 
occurred. As one volunteer noted, “By then most of the 
people had actually found a way out or were washed 
out or had died, or volunteers had helped them”. 
However, it must be noted that the NDRF comes into 
play only after the state declares an emergency and 
requests help from central government. In the case 
of the 2015 floods, the state declared an emergency 
on the evening of 2 December, after incessant rains 
and widespread flooding since 1 December. The 
government’s relief operations were hampered by a 
significant shortage of resources in relation to the 
scale of the disaster. In particular, large numbers of 
city corporation workers were themselves stranded by 
the floods and unable to report to work, rendering the 
agency radically short-staffed. The state government 
announced 5 billion rupees (approximately US$78 
million) for relief and rehabilitation across the affected 
region. The implementation for the Chennai flood relief 
was in the hands of the Chennai Corporation who 
immediately established systems to receive, sort, pack, 
and distribute the massive volumes of relief supplies that 
were coming in. This infrastructure was an on-the-spot 
innovation by a senior officer of the corporation, using 
the vast space of the Nehru Stadium and the assistance 
of about 2,000 volunteers a day for a period of about 
two weeks. 
There were other instances of highly effective but 
isolated instances of government effort reported from 
the 2015 flood event. One such was the dynamic 
networking hub set up in one of the zones of the 
corporation by the zonal officer who was called in 
as part of a special inter-departmental architecture 
of disaster response at the zonal level, set up by the 
state government. Being a veteran in handling disaster-
related situations, the zonal officer succeeded in liaising 
effectively with schools, the health department, the 
corporation, and NGO volunteers including medical 
teams, to ensure that potential disease outbreaks were 
kept under check. He did this by setting up processes 
for self-reporting disease outbreak, and providing health 
facilities for sanitation workers helping in the post-
disaster debris removal, among other initiatives. 
The corporation and the revenue department drew 
heavily on the skills, manpower and boats of fisher 
communities across the city in their rescue efforts. 
Other government agencies like the fire and the police 
departments also anchored rescue and relief work 
in many areas. As one key informant noted, “A good 
example is the Kotturpuram police station. They took 
charge of that entire area. They made sure that they 
took care of the residents”. Yet, apart from these few 
examples, the government’s capacity to coordinate 
across its departments and with civil society bodies to 
provide a convergent and organised rescue and relief 
effort for the city emerged as weak.
3.1.1.2 Beyond relief: the medium term
The period of post-disaster rebuilding revealed the 
unfolding of prior agendas and modus operandi of 
the state under new discourses of disaster relief and 
management. 
The timing of the floods accentuated the state and local 
government’s compulsion to appropriate the provision of 
humanitarian action for political mileage. In Chennai, the 
December 2015 floods coincided with the run-up to the 
state assembly elections scheduled for May 2016. The 
government in power, led by Chief Minister Jayalalitha, 
keenly promoted an image of proactive outreach and 
intervention to compensate and rehabilitate flood 
victims. These political compulsions, combined with 
the authoritarian political culture in the state under her 
regime could also partly explain why state bureaucrats 
tended to fall back on standard disaster management 
protocol despite their inadequacy in the Chennai 
floods, and felt hesitant to partner closely with non-
governmental actors in the city. Thus, it was officers 
from the neighbouring state of Karnataka, Manivannan 
(IAS) and his team of IAS and IPS officers, that helped 
initiate the Chennai Rain Relief Centre. Working from 
Bangalore, he “could do a lot of things local officials 
couldn’t”, as stated by the head of an NGO that was 
part of Chennai Rain Relief. 
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The state government’s lack of capacity and data 
for assessing disaster impacts on the population, 
and the inflexibility of its institutional architecture for 
providing relief were evidenced by the nature of post-
flood compensation undertaken in Chennai. This 
compensation was provided in the form of a standard 
cash amount of �5,000 per household (approximately 
US$80) across the board to save time and resources 
for targeting specific vulnerable groups or those 
who could not afford self-recovery. This amount was 
found by studies to be extremely insufficient for the 
affected (Arunodhaya et al., 2016). The nature of the 
compensation involving cash distribution as against 
assistance tailored to specific needs (such as job 
opportunities, livelihood assets, improved transport 
facilities) had arguments both in favour and against. 
While some pointed to the state’s lack of orientation to 
post-disaster needs and vulnerabilities of those affected, 
others perceived this as an open compensation 
for people to self-assess their needs and spend 
accordingly. 
The period after the floods also saw a resurgence of 
exclusionary aspects of the state’s development agenda 
under the guise of rehabilitation. Extreme events have 
been used as reasons to justify the relocation of poor 
people and clear squatter encroachments from lands 
that the government plans to allocate to more lucrative 
purposes (Jain, Bazaz et al. 2016). The 2004 tsunami, 
for instance, “came in handy” [KII_NGO] for the state’s 
plans to remove fishing villages along the coast to 
build a coastal highway and for other infrastructure and 
commercial projects. A concerted effort was made 
to relocate fishers to inland sites, but they had limited 
success because of local resistance. Nevertheless, 
the large resettlement sites of Kannaginagar and 
Semmencherry received influxes of slum dwellers and 
fisher families from the city in the months following the 
tsunami, enabling the state to clear lands in the city 
for higher-value uses. Thus, the post-disaster moment 
demonstrates tensions between the government’s role 
as a provider of relief and rehabilitation, and its pre-
existing agendas of land acquisition and commercial 
development. 
3.1.2 NGO actors
Wide variations were evident in the scale and form of 
humanitarian action by NGOs, which constitute a highly 
diverse group, ranging from small grassroots groups, 
to loose collectives, social movement secretariats, 
specialised agencies, and policy think-tanks. 
3.1.2.1 Short-term relief action
Grassroots NGOs typically reached out to their own 
constituencies, making efforts to source relief materials, 
raise funds, and take care of their immediate and 
medium-term needs. In doing so, they forged new 
relations and partnerships that sustained after the event, 
and opened up opportunities and directions in their 
ongoing work. For instance, a small trade union working 
with informal women workers found that they were 
approached by funding agencies and corporate bodies 
for help in the disbursement of relief supplies during 
the tsunami and the floods. The experience of assisting 
such agencies turned into ongoing working relationships 
after the events, whereby the union acquired new 
funding support. Some NGOs also described how their 
prior efforts at building community resilience through 
livelihood strengthening, training, and capacity building 
helped mitigate losses during the floods. For example, in 
several government-run shelters in schools, people were 
given no food. So, NGOs mobilised food and healthcare 
through their existing networks in the affected 
communities (KII from Arnodaya, November 2016). 
The extreme events provided an opportunity for several 
local NGOs with a strong ground presence to leverage 
their understanding of the local context to improve 
the efficacy of humanitarian action (both relief 
targeting, and provision), as well as support other 
actors such as the government. Their strong roots in 
community relationships also enabled innovations by 
NGOs and civil society groups in relief outreach 
during the floods of 2015. For instance, respondents 
from the organisation Arappor Iyakkam described the 
system they had developed for equitable and dignified 
distribution of relief supplies. Citizen volunteers who 
took relief supplies to an affected area often did not 
know how to reach interior parts of the neighbourhood. 
The organisation devised a system where one individual, 
usually an educated woman, was selected from each of 
the severely affected streets within the neighbourhood. 
Women were selected as they typically tend to families 
during disasters. The selected women visited each 
home to fill out forms recording numbers of residents, 
their age and gender. Each family was then given 
a token: 
“The token was … a psychological thing. When they 
receive a token, they feel reassured, they don’t have 
to worry about not receiving relief material. We issued 
tokens to everyone. Once we got the forms back, 
we knew how many people, infants, women, aged 
members, etc., there were, and based on that we 
categorised our relief material into different packs. A 
garment factory was converted into a stocking place, 
and the relief material was segregated there. It went 
absolutely smoothly… People were taking things 
in a dignified manner” (KII from Arappor Iyakkam, 
December 2016). 
A significant form of humanitarian action by civil society 
groups in Chennai was the organic convergence 
of several organisations and individuals onto 
coordinated platforms. Among the most prominent 
platforms in the 2015 floods was Chennai Rain Relief. 
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This platform was, interestingly enough, initiated by a 
government (Indian administrative services) officer from 
Bangalore. However, in Chennai, it was maintained 
and run by a group of NGOs (Bhoomika and AID 
India included) that had acquired expertise in disaster 
response from their experiences in other contexts, 
such as the earthquake in Goonj, Gujarat, or the 2004 
tsunami. This platform soon became the central clearing 
house for humanitarian efforts of individuals, NGOs, 
CBOs, and corporate groups across the city. 
Technology played a key role in leveraging the volunteer 
efforts, including coordinating relief supplies between 
Bangalore and Chennai. After a day or two of being 
cut off, the volunteer effort was animated through 
vigorous ground-up development and the deployment of 
innovative information and communication systems that 
used mapping and social media. Information became 
open source, organically communicated, and widely 
accessed. An activist from Arappor Iyakkam recalled: 
“[Initially], we had to wade and swim through the 
water to see how many streets were submerged and 
to what level. We began putting all this information 
online because people who lived outside the state 
or the country did not know what was happening to 
their loved ones. Information was not coming in, cell 
phone signals were gone, electricity was disrupted 
and hence no communication was possible [directly 
from affected areas]. We then went to the affected 
areas and began mapping out how many streets 
were affected, we clicked photographs, shot videos 
and uploaded those on Facebook. … The response 
from the public was enormous, everybody started 
asking for information. Even the NDRF contacted us” 
(KII, December 2016). 
The effect of flooding on connectivity and 
communication was not city wide, which made it 
possible for the volunteers to make information available 
online instantly. 
Another activist recalled that Chennai Rain Relief filled 
gaps in inter-governmental communication: 
“The strangest thing was when I got a call from the 
coast guard asking to know where to send trucks of 
stuff that had to be put on boats and sent to places. 
I asked them why were they calling me and then 
directed them to the Chennai Rain Relief. So, the 
coast guard had no connection with the government” 
(KII, November 2016). 
This suggests the role of informal actors as information 
brokers in Chennai’s post-disaster period, which was 
characterised by poor information and connectivity 
between humanitarian actors. 
In fact, key protocols, inputs and innovations on disaster 
response seemed to come primarily from the non-
governmental sector. As one member of the platform 
Chennai Rain Relief commented: 
“We have a disaster management division in the 
government, but I don’t think they take any proactive 
measures. [It] surfaces only after the disaster. 
So, there is no coordinated plan by the disaster 
management committee. But, some NGOs have 
actually thought through what to do, how to do 
it… Across India, if you look, there are a very few 
groups who do coordinated, sustainable, long-
term rehabilitation process. Groups like Goonj, Aid 
India, Bhoomika Foundation, they know the process 
of how to get onto the ground and what sort of 
implementation they need”. 
NGOs were also more resourceful; as one respondent 
said, “NGOs are cash strapped so we don’t like to 
duplicate our work and were careful with giving relief”. 
This contrasts with other reports, particularly on bigger 
international NGOs, as well as government sponsored 
relief, of mismatches between relief demand and supply, 
and unused relief creating a waste issue (Arunodhaya 
et al., 2016). 
3.1.2.2 The medium term
Several NGOs in Chennai became involved in long-
term rehabilitation and reconstruction after the tsunami. 
Organisations like Bhoomika and Arappor in Chennai, 
after their active role in coordinating relief and rescue 
efforts across the city during the 2015 floods, found 
themselves taking up some – albeit limited – long-term 
rehabilitation projects, specifically in building some 
houses in Mudichur and Samathuva Periyar Nagar. As 
one NGO staff noted: 
“we realised we would not be able to handle long-
term rehabilitation work as well. But we decided to 
do it in just one area. We allotted some of the amount 
from the donations that came, into that and we had 
private owners coming in and helping”.
Conversely, while many NGOs focus on long-term 
developmental work, they are not necessarily trained 
and equipped for post-disaster action. While the deep 
engagement of small NGOs in specific locations allows 
for better targeting, their context-specific knowledge 
often limits their geographical scope of action. After 
the floods, NGO workers themselves commented 
on their lack of formal training and preparation for 
humanitarian action: 
“We had no training for the rescue operations. We 
had no idea of what we were going to face. In order 
to train others, we too needed to have certain details. 
We couldn’t go to certain areas because water levels 
were too high. At night, there was absolute darkness 
and we could see nothing. A few of us who had 
inverters were able to connect to the internet and 
use maps so that we could plan out which areas 
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could be visited. On the previous days, people had 
informed us about who needed to be rescued. We 
had to prioritise which areas to visit, the most affected 
ones, because we could only handle so much” (local 
activists)
It is critical to note that the issues mentioned above, 
such as limited training, difficulties accessing areas, 
and no electricity were as limiting for the government 
as for NGO actors. However, the critical difference 
was that throughout our interviews, we found NGO 
and civil society actors more reflective of their own 
shortcomings, while government respondents (barring 
a few) tended to showcase their efforts as positive 
and effective. 
3.1.3 Community-level and individual 
actors
Extreme events, such as the tsunami and the floods 
of 2015, evoke an overwhelming scale of response 
from individual citizens, motivated by empathy and 
the urge to ‘do something’. After the floods, the 
outpouring of individual voluntarism yielded significant 
human resources equipped with a range of skills and 
capacities, which also mobilised vast amounts of 
material resources, such as food, clothing, medical 
supplies, and funds. Where platforms to coordinate the 
collection and distribution of relief were established 
by government agencies or NGOs, as outlined above, 
voluntary efforts were used effectively. Where individual 
efforts were not coordinated, the results were often 
mismatched demand and supply. For example, many 
individuals distributed cooked food to communities that 
had already received food, and where the need was for 
dry provisions or other kinds of supplies.
Humanitarian action by individuals was mainly in the 
nature of short-term charity actions such as distributing 
food and clothes, with little deeper engagement in 
the locations. We also interviewed volunteers who, on 
witnessing the scale of devastation after the tsunami, 
took months of leave from their jobs to devote time to 
the relief effort. In some cases, the experience also 
changed the trajectory of their ongoing work. Illustrative 
examples include an engineer working in IT who 
became actively involved in the outreach efforts of AID 
India, while another individual started a school for tribal 
children orphaned by the tsunami in Nagapattinam, 
devoting several years to this initiative.3
More generally, both disasters brought specific 
landscapes, vulnerable populations, and issues of 
the city to the public’s attention. Respondents noted 
how the tsunami brought to the larger urban public a 
‘discovery that Chennai had fisher folk’. After the floods, 
public attention was drawn to informal settlements 
on river banks and lake edges, and more crucially 
to questions about the repercussions of Chennai’s 
urbanisation choices on its ecology and natural 
resources. The medium term saw a rise in the critical 
engagement of large numbers of youth volunteers 
across the city in reflections and action on ecological 
governance through various platforms that were formed 
in early 2016. 
In communities that were most severely affected by the 
floods, relief supplies were channelled in by individuals 
who acted as gatekeepers. Often, these were youth or 
established community leaders who found their way 
out of the area to liaise with NGO or government relief 
efforts and bring them to the community. However, 
NGO relief workers noted that while these gatekeepers 
eased micro-level distribution, especially in areas where 
the need was acute, they wielded considerable power 
in deciding who got which goods. This sometimes 
prevented effective and equitable relief distribution. One 
NGO respondent claimed that these gatekeepers were 
often not established local authorities, but individuals or 
groups who had emerged to capture power in the crisis, 
when large numbers of outsiders were looking for entry 
points to distribute relief. 
In conclusion, the humanitarian actors and actions 
mapping highlighted, in the context of Chennai: 
• How various compulsions and capacities come to 
the fore during and immediately after the disaster, 
complicating normal relations between government 
and civil society. 
• That responsiveness, flexibility, and capacity to 
innovate made NGOs effective actors in a large-scale 
disaster, despite their limited reach and scale.
• That despite holding the resources for city-wide scale 
and reach, the city government was constrained by 
several characteristics typical of a public bureaucracy. 
• That there were differential styles, capacities and 
performance of different government agencies, 
necessitating the need for disaggregated analysis 
of the government’s role as a humanitarian actor. 
It also pointed to a strong imperative for effective 
partnership-building between government agencies 
and civil society bodies to share skills and enhance 
the overall preparedness of the city for events in 
the future.
3 https://scroll.in/article/695450/how-the-2004-tsunami-changed-the-fate-of-tamil-nadus-poorest-nomads 
www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/nobodys-child-goes-to-school/229716
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3.2 Entrenched 
vulnerability and disaster 
impacts
What are the existing vulnerabilities before and 
due to the disasters, prior to any humanitarian 
action?
The two prominent disasters that hit Chennai over the 
past decade impacted two distinct sets of landscapes 
and their occupants. The tsunami was a coastal 
disaster, primarily affecting fisher communities and other 
coastal residents, while the floods affected low-lying 
lands, the edges of waterbodies, and rivers within the 
city. Although it was hypothesised that these disasters 
had ‘levelling’ impacts across social classes, in reality, 
certain sections of the urban population in Chennai 
were more deeply impacted due to the consolidation of 
multiple vulnerabilities (for example, a poorly networked 
family in a flood-hit area was worse off than a family with 
strong social networks in the same site). 
The government’s definition of vulnerability in the 
context of disasters in Chennai is predominantly 
technical, defined by physical submergence levels of 
land and housing. As spokespersons for state agencies 
described it, Chennai’s extremely flat deltaic terrain, 
with a maximum gradient of 2.5m from west to east, 
made the discharge rate of water slow, making drainage 
a major preoccupation in thinking about disasters. 
However, as findings in this section reveal, disaster risk 
and vulnerability are constituted through the interaction 
of socioeconomic, institutional, and biophysical factors 
(such as the availability of good drainage systems). 
A historical and ongoing shortage of affordable shelter 
in Indian cities has resulted in the dwellings of the urban 
poor being concentrated in hazardous locations on 
river floodplains, low-lying areas or the edges of the 
coast. Not only are they thereby exposed to more severe 
impacts of flooding, cyclones, or tsunami than other 
urban residents, the set of quotidian risks they face 
aggravates these impacts, creating a highly unequal 
landscape of disaster impacts. Humanitarian actions, 
whether by government or non-government actors, 
typically address the immediate impacts, but do little to 
mitigate these underlying and unequal vulnerabilities. 
The following discussion identifies the impacts of 
various extreme events on these vulnerable people and 
communities, as revealed after the tsunami and the 
2015 floods, and as emerged from our interviews with 
slum and resettled households in our study. 
3.2.1 Disaster impacts on vulnerable 
communities
Loss of productive and non-productive assets, 
and livelihoods emerged as the single-most 
devastating outcome experienced by most people 
during the recent floods and cyclone as well during 
the tsunami. Homes, household assets such as TVs, 
fridges, other electronic goods, bicycles, and livestock 
were counted as among the significant losses, although 
these were offset against the fact that their lives were 
saved. 
[“We lost everything in the house, we only saved 
ourselves” (PMB/AIB/01); 
“All household assets – TV, utensils – were washed 
away in tsunami and electronic gadgets got damaged. 
However, in my family there was no loss of lives for 
which I am grateful” (KNG/AIB/06)]. 
Reflecting on Moser and Dani’s perspective on asset 
accumulation as a household strategy for poverty 
reduction (Moser and Dani 2008), these losses 
could have a long-term implication on people’s 
vulnerability outcomes. 
For those who had recently spent their life savings 
(often also with loans) in upgrading their existing 
houses, they lost all that too during floods (PMB/
AIB/05). No forms of insurance were available for them 
or support to help repay their loans. Some households 
mentioned how their regular sources of livelihoods 
were affected, often for long periods of time, in some 
cases because they were required to attend to more 
immediate needs at home. [“After the tsunami, we lost 
all household assets and I lost my job” (KNG/AIB/02); 
“We were not able to step out of the house to even buy 
a packet of milk for my granddaughter. We did not go 
for work for nearly a month” (KNG/AIB/06); “We lost 
our coffee shop” (KNG/AIB/07)].
The second most important loss identified was that of 
identity cards, especially in cases where people had 
to evacuate at very short notice. Many, however, said 
that they prioritised these items in what they could 
salvage. Thus, these vulnerable urban households, 
who had borne the brunt on multiple hazards over 
these years, had clearly learned some key lessons of 
surviving disasters, among them that identity (ID) cards 
function as valuable assets in getting them access to 
entitlements from the government. These ID cards form 
a key differentiator between those ‘identified’ as poor 
and vulnerable and those who are excluded from that 
category despite real needs. [“Luckily I gave ID cards 
in my brother’s house and so did not lose that” (KNG/
AIB/06)]. 
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Challenges to health and safety and fear of disease 
were reported in most areas, since sewage and solid 
waste had mixed with the rainwater that entered houses. 
The damage caused to homes by this water took 
several weeks to repair. Such conditions carried a high 
potential for causing outbreaks of disease. However, 
this was effectively prevented by state campaigns that 
encouraged people to scrub their homes with bleaching 
powder, and widespread provision of supplies of this. 
Within these vulnerable households, the elderly, 
disabled, pregnant women, children and chronic 
patients were most acutely vulnerable, as they were 
often stranded with no immediate help. [“I was pregnant 
and had to rush to hospital but couldn’t find any auto 
or bus, hence had to walk for nearly two hours to the 
hospital in Thiruvallikani” (SMY/AIB/04)].
Access to services was disrupted. Many who lived on 
higher floors, although they did not have to evacuate 
their homes, suffered from lack of water, electricity, and 
even food for several days. There was a price inflation 
of daily needs-based consumables. Banks were 
not accessible for several days. [“Though the houses 
did not get damaged, we were unable to step out of 
the house to buy groceries. There was no drinking 
water available and no electricity. Half litre milk which is 
usually sold at �25 was sold at �100” (KNG/AIB/07)]. 
Many people ended up borrowing money to pay for 
the immediate needs and recovery (KNG/AIB/09). 
Box 1. LESSonS fRoM tHE fLooDS: tHE unIquE 
vuLnERABILIty of CHRonICALLy ILL pAtIEntS
The disaster management machinery of the state and 
city governments received widespread accolades 
for having successfully averted a potentially massive 
epidemic of cholera or other communicable disease 
following the floods of 2015. A senior official 
commented: 
“This reflected the efforts, the planning, the 
leadership of the state, with the Chief Minister 
herself closely monitoring the situation. It was 
a learning about our own strength. … It is easy 
to criticise the government, but there has to be 
recognition for the tremendous work that has been 
done after this flood”.
Representatives from an NGO working in the field of 
health affirmed that the state health department had 
done a good job in averting a health crisis. Here again, 
they distinguished among state health bureaucracies. 
They described the GoTN’s Department of Public 
Health (DPH) as a reasonably well-equipped 
institution, engaged in research and capable of 
responding effectively to events like the floods. On 
the other hand, the Chennai Corporation’s health 
department did not have the technical capacity to 
manage health outreach during disasters. There was 
a long-term demand to merge the corporation’s health 
section with the DPH. Five large corporations in Tamil 
Nadu have separate health departments.
After the floods, the Tamil Nadu State Planning 
Commission (TNSPC) held a special meeting to 
discuss the unique vulnerability during floods of 
patients with chronic illnesses such as HIV/AIDS, TB 
and diabetes. Many HIV patients, for instance, had 
lost their medicines in the floods and were unable 
to reach government dispensaries to replace them. 
According to doctors among our key informants, 
most did not know what medicines they were taking. 
Typically, each patient was administered a specific 
configuration of antiretroviral (ARVs). Because of 
the stigma associated with the disease, they often 
tore up the packaging. It was only by going back to 
the dispensary that had their medical records that 
they could refill their prescriptions. What made this 
more serious was the potential of developing drug 
resistance if patients missed their medications for 
a week. 
At the TNSPC consultation, a group of disaster 
management and health experts, health activists, 
and doctors discussed these issues. The outcome 
was an agreement by the state that during disasters 
of this kind, emergency ad hoc groups would be set 
up to carry out special outreach for these patients, 
visiting them at their doorsteps to administer their 
medications. Since these patients were registered 
with the health department, the government would 
have the information necessary to reach them. This 
incident highlights the proactive role played by some 
state agencies to identify special vulnerabilities, 
learn from experiences, consult with a range of 
stakeholders, and devise solutions for the future.
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3.2.2 Disaster impacts in resettlements 
colonies
Resettlement colonies face especially harsh impacts 
both during and after disasters, as their routine set of 
vulnerabilities gets exacerbated during episodes of 
stress, whether due to floods, drought, or cyclones. This 
accumulation of effects highlights the fact that disaster 
vulnerability is strongly related to inequity and is a 
function of broader socioeconomic and spatial patterns 
of vulnerability. 
Baseline vulnerabilities and siting
All the three resettlement colonies in the southern 
part of the city are located on highly vulnerable geo-
hydrological sites, where heavy construction and mass 
settlement are, as many experts have noted, a priori 
disasters. In Semmencherri, the risk of flooding is 
further accentuated by the fact that it is bordered on 
all sides by elite residences or commercial buildings 
which have insulated themselves against flooding 
by elevating their plinths or constructing walls. All of 
these block the drainage of water and lower the level 
of the resettlement colony relative to the surrounding 
areas, drawing in the floodwaters. In the 2015 floods, 
Semmencherri resettlement colony obtained relief 
only by breaking the wall built by Chettinad Cements, 
which allowed the water to drain out. However, the 
wall was promptly rebuilt. Consequently, the rains that 
accompanied Cyclone Vardah on 12 December 2016, 
although not particularly heavy, brought flooding again 
to Semmencherri, which lasted more than four days. 
Inadequacies in infrastructure and service
Apart from the small size of units, which made it difficult 
for families to offer shelter to each other during the 
floods, a number of other shortages in infrastructure 
exacerbated the suffering of residents. Kannaginagar 
and Semmencherry do not have community halls 
which could be used for shelter or relief supply. Since 
electricity had been disconnected, the colonies 
received no water for several days. Broken sewage 
lines meant that the floodwater that entered the ground 
floor houses was filled with sewage. Health facilities 
in Semmencherry are limited to a poorly-equipped 
part-time PHC, which mostly refers people on to other 
hospitals in the city. 
Neglect
The distance of these resettlement sites from the centre 
of the city turned into isolation during the floods. The 
colonies were unreachable for several days by relief 
volunteers. Most crucially, despite the fact that these 
were neighbourhoods created by the government, they 
were abandoned by the government in the key moments 
of crisis. Offices of state agencies in these colonies 
were unattended for several days and residents claimed 
that they did not receive any visits from state officials in 
the immediate aftermath of the floods. Relief supplies 
were dropped by helicopter onto the main roads, and 
there were scuffles and fights to access them. Without 
social mechanisms for equitable distribution, those who 
did not have the capacity to struggle for access to relief 
supplies in this situation went without. 
Vulnerability is constituted, then, by a convergence of 
factors including spatial isolation, poor amenities, lack of 
social organisation, and institutional neglect.
3.2.3 Challenges for humanitarian 
action: insights from the Semmencherry 
case
The physical and institutional conditions in resettlement 
colonies create a special set of challenges for the 
provision of humanitarian assistance. Drawing on 
the Semmencherry case, we identified a cascade of 
challenges:
1. Concentration of vulnerable populations: 
Resettlement colonies have very large 
concentrations of income-poor and 
socioeconomically vulnerable families, the 
majority of whom are dependent on casual or 
informal employment. Even small disruptions in 
the routine order can spell a loss of employment 
for large numbers, with few resources within the 
neighbourhood on which to draw. 
2. Acute sense of helplessness and vulnerability: 
Volunteers who arrive with relief supplies face a 
rush of people trying to grab material before it 
disappears. Distribution of relief supplies becomes 
undignified and unsatisfactory, leaving volunteers 
with a bad taste, and large number of households 
unserved. Families who do not have members 
that can successfully struggle and obtain supplies 
are left with nothing. All this is due to the lack of 
functioning CBOs who can liaise with providers 
of humanitarian assistance and ensure effective 
distribution. A mismatch between materials supplied 
and needed also emerges rapidly, as volunteers have 
little information on the differentiated needs. 
3. Disconnection from mainstream governance: 
Distance from the city makes these settlements often 
the last to be reached with relief efforts, particularly 
from the state, which was absent for many days after 
the floods. 
4. Spatial disposition: The Semencherry colony of 
over 6,500 households and 100 streets has a single 
entry point, constraining distribution of humanitarian 
assistance. This, combined with the absence of any 
form of sociospatial organisation of the community 
into smaller units, brings about a highly-skewed 
Long-term impLications of humanitarian responses | The case of chennai
24     www.iied.org
distribution. Given the size of the settlement, very 
few non-government providers of assistance are 
able to provide enough relief material to cover all the 
families. Consequently, there are either skirmishes or 
the quiet appropriation of benefits by more powerful 
residents who prevent materials reaching the 
inner area. 
5. Poor state of infrastructure: Dysfunctional 
sewage systems render flooding extremely 
hazardous as the floodwaters have high sewage 
content. Similarly, since electricity wires are 
exposed and poorly connected, they get promptly 
disconnected and take much longer to be restored 
than in the rest of the city. While much of south 
Chennai lost power after the floods for four to five 
days, in Semmencherry, power was restored after 
ten days. This also has repercussions on the water 
supply. As there are no overhead water storage 
tanks in Semmencherry, electricity is needed to 
pump water up from the distribution lines. After the 
cyclone, houses did not receive water for several 
days as electricity was not available.
6. Lack of effective community-level 
organisation: In Semmencherry, a representative 
of an NGO working in the colony noted: “If I want 
to do something for Semmencherry, what should 
I do? What is needed? Is there a holistic or 
collective action group for Semmencherry? Not at 
all”. There are many causes explained by experts 
for this including the heterogeneity of communities 
brought together to live in one place under varying 
circumstances and terms of payments. 
From the above, we surmise that it is pertinent to identify 
or create local social infrastructure, such as CBOs, local 
leaders, to liaise with providers, receive and effectively 
channel context-relevant relief assistance according to 
need. Also, care should be taken to ensure that relief 
materials should not exacerbate risks. Plastic packaging 
of relief supplies caused a major problem after the 2016 
floods, choking the already malfunctioning drainage 
system and adding to sanitation risks. A representative 
from Thozhamai noted that following their efforts to 
prevent a recurrence of this, in the cyclone relief efforts 
in December 2016, people brought their own vessels to 
receive food and water. 
It is important to ensure that humanitarian efforts 
preserve and enhance, rather than diminish, the dignity 
and self-esteem of the residents. Current modes of 
distribution such as air-dropping and single-point 
distribution provoke grabbing and scuffles which 
may contribute to conflicts and disharmony in the 
medium term.
3.3 Ratchet effects: long-
term implications of 
humanitarian action on the 
people and the city
What are the socioeconomic, environmental, 
and political outcomes in the medium and long 
term of these humanitarian actions?
3.3.1 Implications of humanitarian 
action on people and communities 
Vulnerability to disaster is constituted and exacerbated 
by wider socioeconomic processes such as poverty, 
precarious livelihoods, informal housing in hazardous 
locations, dependence on state services, and a chronic 
neglect by the state. As events such as floods, droughts, 
and cyclones increase in frequency and intensity in 
Chennai, this acute vulnerability turns chronic. In such 
a context, the humanitarian action taken often fails to 
account for such deeply engrained processes, and has 
a long-term effect on the precarious socioeconomic 
and political conditions. The following are some 
such outcomes: 
Loss of dignity
The manner in which humanitarian actions have been 
targeted at vulnerable and poor sections of people 
seems to render these communities heavily dependent 
on external assistance, and negatively affects their 
dignity. This was noted as a concern by many NGO 
actors, who found that the style of relief distribution 
often “reduced proud communities to being like 
beggars”. The ‘pathology of giving’ following a large-
scale disaster also produces pathologies of receiving. 
There were reports of fights, scuffles, and truckloads of 
relief supplies being hijacked by groups of people from 
villages en route to their destinations. As one local NGO 
respondent noted, 
“the point that I want to make [is], that people have 
dignity. They are not asking for handouts. They lived 
dignified lives before the disaster struck. … [They] 
can be helped while keeping their dignity intact”. 
An important ongoing challenge, then, is to devise 
modes of relief distribution that maintain or even 
enhance the dignity of vulnerable people. The use of 
tokens distributed by Arrappor Iyakkam (discussed in 
Chapter 1) was one such innovation. 
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Lack of choice and autonomy in post-disaster 
resettlement
On the question of agency over their decision to move, 
families evicted after the tsunami and the floods offered 
a range of complex perspectives. While post-tsunami 
relocation drives were widely resisted, especially 
among fishing communities who were most affected by 
the disaster, many families (Dalits, renters, and some 
fishers) moved ‘voluntarily’ as their demands for housing 
within the city had not yielded results, eviction seemed 
inevitable, and allotments in the resettlement colonies 
were perceived as an opportunity to acquire an asset. 
Some SSIs noted: 
“After the tsunami, when we were informed that we 
were allotted houses here, people went to see the 
place. We did not like the house – it was too small 
and very far from the city. Initially we protested, 
demanding houses in Santhome itself, but since 
we didn’t have a house, we had to move here” 
(KNG/AIB/07). 
The decision-making process of identifying those who 
were living in hazard-prone areas and those being 
allotted housing was complex, but did not include any 
participation from the affected communities. Evictions 
were carried out based on a line drawn by the PWD to 
mark the boundary of the riverbanks. All houses within 
the line were removed, while those just beyond the line 
were allowed to remain. Accommodation in resettlement 
colonies was offered based on an enumeration of 
residents conducted in 2012 for the centrally sponsored 
Rajiv Awaas Yojna (RAY) housing programme. Those 
not on the list did not receive an allotment. Organised 
opposition to resettlement was encountered in certain 
areas along the riverbanks where many incremental 
houses had been built over the years on highly 
valuable lands. 
Those who had been resettled after the 2015 floods felt 
that they did not have much of an option, as the plan to 
remove them had been long pending. Many claimed that 
they had very little notice before being moved, but had 
been prepared for this eventuality for a long time: 
“We were already warned [in 2012] that people 
living near river banks will be evacuated and moved 
to other places. The government asked us to move 
and they said if we did not move, our houses will be 
demolished and we would not be allotted houses. 
People came and took photos; when we asked who 
they were they said ‘census’, but we knew that they 
were going to remove us from here” (PMB/AIB/05). 
“We did not have a choice. We were threatened 
that if we did not move we would not be helped in 
the future if there are floods. But there are still 250 
families living there who did not want to move here” 
(PMB/AIB/06). 
“Our houses often get flooded as we lived along the 
Adyar river. So we were advised to move out of the 
place” (PMB/AIB/01).
Although a few families had welcomed the promise 
of resettlement, and even actively pursued its 
implementation, some noted: 
“Our houses in Surya Nagar often got flooded and 
we had lost many of our assets. We did not want to 
face these risks again so moved here. Initially, many 
people opposed their proposal to move us here, but 
a few [of] us were anxious to get a house. So we 
approached the Chief Minister to request a house 
here (in Perumbakkam). We also requested them 
to speed up the process because it was winter and 
we could not live on rubble with open roof” (PMB/
AIB/03). 
“Actually, we requested [for] these allotments. 
It was our decision (to move) as we had no other 
choice. The floods had frightened us and we 
realised that it isn’t easy to rebuild everything we lost. 
If not for the floods we would have never vacated 
[from] our locality” (PMB/H/01). 
“We wanted to own a house so we chose to move 
here… Our houses and possessions got washed 
away in the tsunami; we were not even able to 
identify our land. So we decided to move here. A 
house was what we [got] as assistance from the 
government, because we were living on the streets 
and eating whatever we got. We protested for [a] 
house and got it. But till date we don’t have patta 
[legal title] for this house” (SMY/AIB/06). 
However, for many, the realities of the move had sunk in 
only after the resettlement: 
“We had no option but to move here, the government 
had given us this place. But after coming here, most 
people are suffering because there are no jobs. 
In Kotturpuram we had some source of income” 
(PMB/H/03). 
“We were happy there and we had everything. 
Although all our people are around we don’t feel at 
home here. The government allotted us a place in 
Kannaginagar, but we were not willing to go and 
stay amongst those people. So we demanded this 
allotment. But this is very far from the city and we do 
not have proper bus facilities and medical facilities” 
(PMB/H/01). 
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Loss of political agency
Some families categorically pointed out that in the 
previous location 
“we knew our MLAs [local elected members to the 
legislative assembly] and other party leaders and we 
used to get help from there. But here we are new and 
we do not know anyone yet” (PMB/AIB/01; PMB/
AIB/03). 
“We want to put up shops here, and would 
like government support. This area falls under 
Kanchipuram district so [we] not sure if we have 
to approach the Kanchipuram collector or Chennai 
collector” (PMB/AIB/07). 
They also claimed that if they went alone to complain 
about anything (eg leaking walls, etc.) it didn’t make 
any impact, although if they went as a group then it did 
(PMB/AIB/03). 
Mistrust
Many households claimed they didn’t trust the 
government much, especially after it started asking 
for rent once they moved, even though they were told 
initially that they would not be required to pay rent in the 
new location. Many also did not trust that the services, 
such as overhead tanks, were cleaned or well-kept and 
so did not end up using the water for drinking (PMB/
AIB/01; PMB/AIB/06). 
Loss of identity
Despite being moved and now living in new places 
for a long time, people still identify themselves with 
places where they lived earlier. For example, Santhome 
remained a site of identity because of the church, the 
access to schools, opportunities to do domestic work. 
Even after 10 to 13 years of living in Kannaginagar, 
people called it ‘a new place’. This points to issues 
of belonging and identity – if they didn’t self-identify 
as being a resident, what incentives did they have to 
invest in and take care of the ‘new’ relocated spaces? 
Moreover, such mass handouts do not offer a sense of 
ownership and uniqueness to the beneficiaries. 
“Older house was built by us, so it was big. This one 
is not as big as the old one. All the houses here look 
the same” (PMB/AIB/01); 
“This is a jail. We all feel like prisoners. Older 
place was bigger and safer. Almost every day there 
are fights in the neighbourhood. Due to crime 
and bad reputation residents of Kannaginagar 
(KN) don’t receive jobs. Recently, a politician was 
murdered here. This place is very unsafe. I live with 
granddaughters and we survive on the pension that 
I get. But [a] few government officers take bribe[s] 
from me to give me my widow pension” (KNG/
AIB/11).
Inappropriate infrastructure causing long-
term resistance to change
Following the tsunami, humanitarian assistance made 
a range of investments in infrastructures and services, 
from housing, toilets, and school buildings, to boats, 
livelihood training, and economic programmes. While 
some of these assets added significant value to the 
lives of communities in the long run, many failed the 
test of time. Many programmes started for children – 
new school, theatre initiatives, community radio and 
TV programmes – are reported to have worked well 
and been sustained over time. However, there are 
large numbers of houses standing abandoned due to 
their location. One respondent described how toilets 
were built by various NGOs in the coastal areas after 
the tsunami to reduce open defecation, without taking 
into account the high water table in these areas. The 
resulting overflows in toilets discouraged communities 
in the long run from using toilets. But there was no 
follow-up action for improvements. 
Distorting local economies and causing 
conflicts
As experiences after the tsunami suggest, the massive 
influx of development agencies bringing humanitarian 
resources and funds into affected areas can leave in 
its wake new problems. After the tsunami, a sum of 
�50 lakhs (approximately US$77,000) was given to all 
women’s self-help groups (SHGs) in the affected areas 
by international aid agencies. This led to a spike in the 
loan amounts, along with an increase in interest rates, 
making repayment difficult. Some social activists also 
noted how these large injections of cash assistance 
created conflicts, including reports of suicide among 
recipient communities: 
“When [so much] money is pumped into a self-
governed system, then the stakes become high. 
Repayment of up to a lakh (approximately US$1,500) 
could have still been resolved within the people. 
But 10 lakhs (approximately US$15,000) were 
too much”. 
Most of these organisations also never returned to 
evaluate their actions. 
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Long-term financial and economic  
implications
Many households reported difficulties in finding jobs 
close by and spending much of their incomes and time 
in travelling. This is particularly a challenge for women 
who cannot afford to leave their homes for too 
long. Several livelihood options are closed: for example, 
selling small goods is not feasible because there is a 
limited market. They are unable to pay the required 
rents (an additional cost after relocation) because 
incomes, and therefore, savings have reduced. 
They also reported a lack of clarity around rental 
amounts and duration, after which the house is 
registered in their name. Some also said they did not 
receive any financial assistance while relocating, 
which was an additional burden. 
Those who used their houses as an economic 
asset in their original locations by renting a room or 
two found this was not an option in the new location. 
Those who set up shops in the resettlement colonies 
are also being asked to remove them. They feel it 
would have been better if the government had pre-
allocated spaces for markets and shops. There is a clear 
distinction between how government officials define 
risks and how people perceive their risks. While housing 
and slum-improvement agencies see rehabilitation 
as compensation (“providing them a house worth 
�10 lakh [approximately US$15,000) free of cost” ) 
and moving them to places “where the risk is less”, 
they fail to sufficiently ameliorate the economic and 
social implications of relocation. Some public officials 
questioned the meaning of ‘outside’ in a city where for 
instance, “North Chennai was also outside the city 
at one time but now it is fully urbanised”. What they 
fail to account for are the adversities experienced 
in that time period until these far-off places get 
urbanised. Yet, those affected would want to return 
to their original places if they continued facing these 
challenges, particularly of finding jobs: 
“Though in Kotturpuram, our houses often got 
flooded (water from Anna University side and water 
from Adyar river), the job was good” (PMB/AIB/01).
Facing resistance from people regarding the move, the 
slum improvement board and the employment board 
organised a ‘job mela’, but its efficacy in helping people 
secure jobs was not high [“All of us did go to the job 
mela in DB Jain college. They took phone numbers 
but never called. I don’t know of anyone who got 
a job there” ](PMB/AIB/01). Some said that issues 
included not meeting the eligibility criteria, or distrust 
since signed agreements were mandatory. They were 
also required to provide different kinds of identity cards 
which many didn’t own. 
Early settlers lost out
Resettlement housing offered to families evicted in 2016 
after the floods were in Perumbakkam and Ezhil Nagar, 
areas within or adjoining the existing (abovementioned) 
colonies. The housing was significantly improved 
over the 2005 allotments: the units were larger –over 
320 sq. ft.– fitted with running water and electricity, 
and infrastructure in the colonies had developed 
over time. Roads, transportation, schools, access to 
markets, employment, and health care had improved, 
yet manifested strong discrimination in the level and 
quality of services in comparison to other urban 
neighbourhoods of Chennai. The older colonies had 
turned into large ghettos, marked with the stigma of 
poverty, alcoholism, drugs, and crime. 
Many, particularly those who were resettled during 
the tsunami (early settlers) also complained that while 
they too were affected during the 2015 floods, they 
received no aid help or support. When they moved, 
“this place was a forest” and there were no markets, 
bus services, hospitals, schools, street lights or jobs 
in the vicinity, although over time it has improved to an 
extent (KNG/AIB/07); (KNG/AIB/10); (SMY/AIB/01); 
(SMY/AIB/04). Some reported many co-settlers 
moved back in the initial years because they could not 
sustain themselves (SMY/AIB/06). More recent movers 
seemed to have a slight advantage since some services 
were already in place. 
Effects on the local economy depleting natural 
resources
Widespread distribution of fishing boats after the 
tsunami was another example of humanitarian 
interventions leaving negative long-term impacts. As 
many fishing communities had lost their wooden boats, 
large numbers of new fibre boats were distributed. 
Since these were much lighter, people could take them 
farther into the sea and carry much more fish back than 
they could before. Some experts indicated that this had 
short-term implications of lowering market prices, and 
in the long-term has led to over-fishing and depletion of 
marine resources, adversely affecting the sustainability 
of livelihoods in fishing communities. These boats have 
been referred to by many as a major environmental 
hazard for this region. 
Indiscriminate distribution of fishing boats to all families 
by development agencies and the government has other 
effects as these donors did not take into account “the 
traditional rules in the community where for instance, 
Dalits [people belonging to a lower caste] and women 
were not allowed to do fishing” (as many social activists 
and NGO actors noted in their interviews). According 
to a local activist, “these ‘well-meaning’ inputs were 
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feeding into traditional conflicts that weren’t understood 
well”. Dalit families and women who received boats 
were neither able to use the boats nor sell them as there 
was no market left after the widespread distribution. 
This resource thus became a liability for them, and 
there were many instances where their safety was 
compromised when they were threatened by other 
members of the community to give up their newly 
acquired asset. Critiques of this action raise some 
important questions about the possibilities of using 
moments of humanitarian action to break through 
traditional forms of exclusion and reach for inclusive 
social outcomes. But a social activist working as a relief 
volunteer at the time of the tsunami commented: “If the 
fishing communities don’t allow their women to the sea, 
you can’t just buy five boats and change that”.
Other limitations
The houses provided were also said to have privacy 
issues (PMB/AIB/07). In Kannaginagar, interviewees 
reported a pregnant woman had to constantly cross the 
neighbour’s house to use the toilet and was sneered at 
each time she crossed. This social stigma was reported 
as one of the reasons that the woman eventually 
committed suicide. Some families also claimed that 
space constraints also meant that men were pushed 
out to public areas or other alternatives like sitting in 
parked auto-rickshaws, etc. Many also took to drugs 
and alcoholism in other men’s company. These 
have had many repercussions for children, families, 
livelihoods and general safety. Some families 
also said that while the house was better, there were 
limitations such as having the tap only in the toilet 
that prevented them from using the water for cooking/
drinking (PMB/AIB/01). They also said that outlet of 
the toilets overflowed, which prevented them from 
using the toilets despite having them inside their houses 
(SMY/AIB/01). Water leakage from toilets and above 
floors was often quoted as a problem (PMB/AIB/05); 
(PMB/AIB/06); (PMB/AIB/07), and it was noted that 
individual complaints were not heard. One household 
also complained: 
“The house is too small and there are open 
drains that flow just outside the kitchen and 
hence we cannot keep the windows open. Already 
there is not enough ventilation and because of the 
bad odour from the open drain and mosquitoes 
we can’t even leave the windows open. The quality 
of water is very bad. Initially it was slightly better 
but now we are getting salt water” (KNG/AIB/09). 
“When we moved in, my sons were 16 but now 
they are 26 and they don’t have a separate room for 
themselves. When we lie down, we can’t even 
stretch ourselves and sleep comfortably” 
(SMY/AIB/05). 
Long-term effects of post-disaster traumatic 
stress
One of the most neglected post-disaster challenges is 
the psychological health of people, both those affected 
directly by the event and those who intervene to assist. 
The failure to recognise and address this issue can 
produce long-term mental health effects, but data on 
such effects remains scant. Health professionals in our 
study reported that a mental health survey had found 
that people were suffering from post-traumatic stress 
several months after the Chennai floods. An NGO head 
also described signs of trauma found among children in 
their work areas, and claimed that they had requested 
the assistance of councillors (trained by NIMHANS) to 
work with them. As Box 2 highlights, trauma suffered by 
relief teams following the tsunami has also been noted, 
but not dealt with in a concerted fashion. 
Positive impacts: For some families, moving has led 
to some improvements. A few families reflected that they 
always lived in fear of floods and cyclones in their earlier 
locations but now they were hopeful towards leading a 
safer life: 
“There if we knew that they have opened (the gates 
of) Chembarambakkam eri [lake], we couldn’t sleep. 
We would live in fear” (PMB/AIB/07). 
Some said that after changing their livelihood (from a 
daily wage worker earlier to a shopkeeper in the new 
place), they had more time for family, and savings 
improved to pay back loans. Some even said that it had 
become easier in getting jobs here, because instead of 
them going out to look for work, some companies are 
coming to them with job offers: 
“Many private companies, even from Apollo hospitals, 
they come here and call us for housekeeping jobs” 
(SMY/AIB/06). 
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3.3.2 Long-term ecological implications 
on the city
Until the 1980s, Pallikarnai marshland played a role of 
a critical wetland for the city of Chennai as well as the 
state of Tamil Nadu. The marsh, located to the south of 
Chennai, is a contiguous low lying area, that receives 
run-off from a catchment area of 235 sq.km (CMDA, 
2008). Rainfall run-off enters the marsh starting from 
Velachery in the north to Arsankalani and other villages 
in the south. The water that gets accumulated in the 
marshland flows through the only outlet, Okkiyam 
Maduvu, into the Buckingham Canal and then south to 
the Kovalam estuary. 
Between 1992 and 2012, the marshland provided 
an opportunity for housing development in the fast-
growing city, which is limited by the coast on the east 
and the state administrative boundary in the north. The 
Box 2. Long-tERM HEALtH AnD SoCIAL IMpLICAtIonS on 
pEopLE AftER RELoCAtIon
Health, education, and basic services
Many people who were moved to Semmencherry and 
Perumbakkam noted that the health and education 
facilities available in the new locations were either 
very limited or very expensive as compared to 
where they lived earlier. Some were also worried that 
with more families being relocated to the same area, 
the limited available services would be even more 
stressed. 
[“There is a government school here but most kids 
go to [the] private school. Actually we need better 
school and hospital facilities here. We were also 
told 20,000 families (living on the river banks) are 
going to move in, don’t know what will happen” 
(PMB/AIB/07); 
“The government school lacks facilities and 
hygiene” (PMB/H/01)]. 
This is a problem that they have to deal with every day 
after being relocated and not just immediately after the 
floods. Although some residents pointed out that this 
experience was different for those who had moved 
from Kotturpuram (as compared to those who moved 
from Adyar and Saidapet). 
[“In Adyar and Saidapet they had schools. But 
in Kotturpuram we had no school van services 
even though we were willing to pay. But here in 
Perumbakkam, school van picks up kids from the 
doorstep so looking at all these, it is better here. 
Because if it rains, the route to Chinnamalai (Little 
Mount) cannot be accessed and hence no van will 
come there. And moreover our streets in Suryatej 
Nagar were very small, so van cannot enter our 
place. But here the roads are bigger so even 5 
to 6 vans come in and pick up children” (PMB/
AIB/03)]. 
Many of these residents also noted that the quality 
of water they get in their apartments is very poor 
and tanks are not maintained regularly, so they have 
to buy packaged water for consumption purposes. 
Some also indicated that the water clogged in certain 
parts of the relocation sites “breeds mosquitos and 
stinks” and many people suffered with skin rashes 
after bathing (PMB/AIB/01); (PMB/AIB/03); (PMB/
AIB/06), (PMB/H/01), (SMY/AIB/05).
Communal differentiation
Even after living together for several years, the post-
tsunami resettled communities find it difficult to mingle 
with the other groups of people living in these areas 
(often moved here post-development led acquisition 
and relocation). Other people being relocated move 
with the notion of getting what is rightfully theirs. They 
perceive the tsunami-affected people as “getting a 
house for free” and this seems to be creating divisions 
and conflict within the community. When people are 
relocated, a false sense of community is created but 
this does not result in maintenance of public spaces 
or cooperative behaviour because these people have 
been cobbled together to create a community. This 
differentiation could also have implications for 
political agency and collective action. 
Safety
These resettlement colonies have a general 
reputation of being “unsafe, unhygienic places 
where hooligans stay”. This makes it difficult for 
people from here to get jobs (“you say you are from 
Kannaginagar, and post is closed for you”, said some 
currently living in Kannaginagar since the tsunami.) 
This is leading to higher rates of unemployment in 
these areas amongst the youth, and also a potential 
cause for wide-spreading alcoholism. Many, 
despite being educated, are finding it hard to get jobs 
because of this reputation (KNG/AIB/01); (SMY/
AIB/05). “The old settlement was safe and women 
had more freedom and were able to move around 
even during late hours.” (KNG/AIB/10); “Other than 
fights in the neighbourhood, this place seems ok. 
Policemen are very cooperative. It is also unsafe for 
people especially women to go out at night” (KNG/
AIB/06). 
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TNSCB built large-scale resettlement colonies filling 
the marshland, largely using funds from the central 
government sponsored JNNURM scheme. A total of 
26,376 units were built on the marsh in Ezhil Nagar 
(Okkiyam Thoraipakkam), Ezhil Nagar (Perumbakkam), 
and Perumbakkam Phase I and II, costing nearly 
₹70,000 crores (approximately US$109 billion) 
(Table 1). These are in addition to the 15,656 houses 
that are built by the state in Kannaginagar and 6,734 
houses in Semmencherry. 
Table 1: List of houses under the JNNURM scheme
SERIAL 
no.
nAME 
of tHE 
SCHEME
no. 
of 
unItS
pRojECt 
CoSt 
(RupEES In 
MILLIonS)
1 Ezhil Nagar 
(OTP)
6,000  2286.00
2 Ezhil Nagar 
(Perumbakkam)
3936  1,753.60
3 Perumbakkam 
Phase I
10,452 6,860.30
3A Perumbakkam 
Phase II
5988 59,880.00
3B Gudapakkam 1,024 714.40
3C Navalur 2,048 1,421.10
3D AIR Land 416 278.40
Total 29,864 17,760.00
Source: TNSCB
This housing construction was followed by a series of 
government-led relocations. In 1996, 1,600 families 
were relocated to Velachery (northern part of the 
marsh) from metro reconstruction sites. After the 2005 
tsunami and 2015 floods, many affected families were 
moved from inner-city or coastal locations such as 
Santhome Church, Surya Teja Nagar, and Saidapet to 
these housing sites over 25km away from their original 
residences (Map 1). 
A government-funded assessment of Pallikarnai Marsh 
(Vencatesan, Daniels et al. 2014) found the marshland 
critically degraded by urbanisation, high groundwater 
extraction, waste dumping, and building upon its 
recharge areas. The area of the marsh has decreased 
from 6,000ha in 1906 to a tenth of its size by 2008. 
Much of the water from the wetland has been pushed 
southwards onto what used to be ‘low and high density 
vegetation’. It is now replaced by ‘moderate to dense 
built- up’. There has been significant land use conversion 
into residential (3,527 ha to 5,742 ha) and industrial 
uses (95 ha to 915 ha), while wetland and water bodies 
have drastically reduced in size (1,045 ha to 385 ha). 
The connection with the Bay of Bengal has also 
narrowed down substantially and is not adequate 
to carry storm water after the annual rains. The area 
reserved for aquifer recharge next in the master plan 
is also entirely built upon. Many argue that these 
developments are in turn leading to the increasing 
frequency of disasters (Drescher et al., 2007)
(Jayaraman 2017). The city master plan also recognises 
that built-up areas in the watershed region get flooded 
during monsoons (CMDA, 2008). Water scarcity 
in Chennai has also been attributed to excessive 
groundwater extraction and increased concretisation of 
peri-urban areas blocking natural percolation, resulting 
in the invasion of brackish ecology in coastal areas 
around the city (Srinivasan, Seto et al. 2013). 
The most significant long-term implication of 
humanitarian interventions after the tsunami and the 
floods, are most likely the transformations in the social 
and ecological landscapes of Chennai. Overlaying 
post-disaster relocation sites on topographical and 
hydrological information shows the discriminatory 
resettlement of displaced populations and disregard 
for the region’s natural ecology (see Map 1 for more 
details). The humanitarian actor here was the state 
government, acting out a convergence of multiple 
governance roles: (i) as a provider of affordable 
housing; (ii) as a provider of post-disaster relief 
assistance as well as long term rehabilitation; and 
(iii) as an implementer of disaster prevention and 
mitigation strategies. 
It is also important to notice a certain pattern in the 
government’s actions and decision on what to keep 
in the city and what to move to the peripheries. Apart 
from housing, the marsh has been used to expand a 
government-managed landfill site. The 2004 tsunami 
in Chennai threatened the fishing communities’ hold 
on their customary rights to coastal lands in Chennai, 
as the government rushed in to remove fishing villages 
from the coast to protect them from future risk. That 
effort was only partially successful, but in the intervening 
decade, Chennai’s southern coastline exploded 
with high-rise housing, luxury resorts, institutional 
campuses, and a large desalination plant, all springing 
up amidst the shrinking fishing villages of Kottivakkam, 
Neelangarai, Nemmeli, and Kovalam. Thus, while the 
stated motive for relocation include reducing people’s 
exposure to local flooding, activists argue that 
“the agenda is not to reduce physical risk but to 
vacate land for other commercial purposes (thus) 
removing the land from the hands of people 
considered ‘unworthy’ of it”. 
In a similar vein, the removal of more than 800 
households living along the riverfront after the 2015 
floods emerges as a selective targeting of vulnerable 
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groups in the name of rehabilitation, especially 
when seen against the fact that numerous other 
‘encroachments’ by the state and elite actors on river 
banks and flood plains are left untouched (including 
the city international airport that is extended on top 
of the same river Adyar, from the floodplains of which 
people are being relocated on the pretext of their 
risk reduction).
Many KIs reflected on the processes with which land 
uses and revenue categories change from being 
pastureland and wetlands (Baden-Powell 1892) to 
‘wastelands’. This accompanies a change in ownership 
from community owned and used lands (commons), to 
the hands of the public or the government. 
“(People) would largely drain the (waterlogged) 
water into the neighbouring area which was a lake. 
Initially the area (now built upon) was the dried 
tracks on the wetland periphery. Then the agricultural 
patches came in followed by wastelands and the 
wetland buffers. This was the pattern. Slowly they 
got designated as wastelands”, noted Jayshree 
Vencatesan, a leading environmentalist. 
These ‘wastelands’ are then used for public buildings, 
including affordable housing, without taking into account 
their environmental purpose.
Many activists, NGO heads, and government officials 
accepted that the relocation sites identified for flood or 
tsunami-affected people were in marshy environmentally-
sensitive areas. An official from the Chennai River 
Restoration Trust pointed out that since the houses 
were already built on those sites, it was easier to move 
people there, although going forward, they would be 
focusing on improving the infrastructure there. Some 
experts also noted that government still prioritises post-
disaster relief distribution over preventative action. 
“Ironically, they have moved these people to places 
which are also very flooded. The attitude itself is 
very startling. The chief secretary who went to the 
central government committee to speak about the 
disaster said that it is economically easier for the 
government to pay people after the disaster 
rather than preparing for the disaster”, said an 
NGO head. 
“I do agree with you that the environmental impacts 
of resettlement need to be looked at more seriously. 
I think not paying attention to environment is going 
to bring a lot more perils to humanity”, said an official 
from the State Disaster Management Authority. 
Despite the move from flood-prone/high hazard risk 
areas, people are clearly being moved to locations 
which are still exposed to floods and potentially pose a 
greater environmental hazard for the city. 
[“Building more houses gives water no space to flow 
out hence there is flooding even if there is less rain” 
(KNG/AIB/08); 
“Here the water remains stagnant for a long time, 
whereas there it drains off soon after the rains” 
(PMB/H/01); 
“Water from first floor toilets are leaking to the ground 
floor. During rainy season, water overflows from 
the toilet and roads get flooded where the water 
stagnates” (SMY/AIB/07)]. 
Other humanitarian relief also had poor environmental 
outcomes. Many experts noted that after the tsunami 
and again after the 2015 floods, much of the relief 
material distributed was environmentally harmful. As an 
environmentalist noted, 
“the immediate response could have been more 
mindful of materials used (eg plastic bottles/sachets 
of water). In the seven days of relief distribution 
following the floods, more than 100,000 tonnes of 
garbage went to the landfill”.
In summary, this section has highlighted that: 
• Apart from the direct implications of facing a disaster, 
there were social, political, psychological, physical, 
economic and environmental implications for affected 
households following humanitarian interventions.
• For the relocated communities, these implications 
included limited access to livelihoods and basic 
physical and social infrastructure, communal 
differentiation, increased safety concerns, loss of 
political agency, identity and autonomy, and thereby 
growing mistrust in the government institutions. 
• There were also many long-term implications for 
the city at large, including environmental issues like 
depletion of marine resources affecting the livelihoods 
of many, solid waste hazards, and wider land-use 
changes from sensitive wetlands to resettlement 
housing sites. 
The image in Figure 2 was taken in Perumbakkam 
during the non-rainy season. Construction over 
environmentally sensitive areas, apart from degrading 
the waterways, could also have health implications of 
water- and vector-borne diseases. 
“The moment there is an unplanned building without 
a clear understanding of public health principles, 
what you’re doing is creating large pockets of water 
collections so things like dengue, chikunguniya, 
and whole range of viruses that are spreading 
is concerning” noted Dr Rakhal Gaitonde from 
SOCHARA.
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Figure 2: Housing built on marshy land is usually water-clogged which could have health implications in the long term
Figure 1: Changes in built-up areas in Kannaginagar, Semmencherry and Perumbakkam over the last decade
Kannaginagar located on Okkiyam Maduvu, 2002 Increased built-up, 2016
Semmencherry and Perumbakkam, 2002  TNSCB housing along with other development built on the 
drainage channel, 2017
Credit: Garima Jain
Source: GoogleEarth Images
IIED WorkIng papEr
   www.iied.org     33
3.4 Looking back and 
learning from humanitarian 
action during disasters
What were the insights and lessons in terms 
of innovations and gaps in humanitarian 
interventions during and after disasters?
Extreme events have strong heuristic effects. They 
leave in their wake an ethos of reflection, insight, and 
learnings from hindsight. However, they also evoke 
a discourse of lessons and learning that reinforces 
rationales for pre-determined agendas, particularly of 
the powerful actors. In this section, we attempt to reflect 
on the lessons learnt by various actors. 
3.4.1 Government’s discourses of 
lessons 
State officials from various departments interviewed 
for this study highlighted a range of new initiatives 
undertaken as a result of the insights and lessons 
gleaned from the 2015 floods. These initiatives are 
outlined below under four categories. 
3.4.1.1 Data collection efforts
State officials described concerted efforts undertaken 
to analyse the nature and causes of the flooding. 
The State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA) 
asked various agencies and departments to prepare 
assessment reports of the floods, and launched a 
detailed district-level vulnerability analysis as a part of 
a state preparedness exercise. Areas were classified 
according to a ranking from ‘very vulnerable’ to ‘not 
vulnerable’, based on their submergence levels, not 
only in the 2015 floods, but also using legacy data. 
Once classified, areas were mapped, and the sources 
and causes of past and potential flooding analysed. 
Assessment of the magnitude of the problem also 
involved indicators such as the number of people 
evacuated, the number of relief centres that were set 
up, the number of days they functioned. The vulnerability 
exercise also recorded temporary to medium-term 
and permanent disaster mitigation measures taken. 
The assessment was conducted by the district 
administration, and in Chennai by the city corporation. 
The corporation exercise identified three categories 
of vulnerability: areas that are chronically flooded, or 
get flooded with even slight rainfall; those that get 
flooded with heavy rainfall; and those that get flooded 
with very heavy rainfall. Vulnerability to floods was thus 
established through these exercises as a technical 
metric, ignoring the complex social, economic, and 
political factors that shape disaster vulnerability in a city 
like Chennai. 
State agencies also focused on improving and 
strengthening their databases after the floods. Officials 
from the CMDA, for instance, confessed that, previously, 
planners did not use, or even have, slope and contour 
maps of the city. Following the disaster, the Corporation 
initiated preparation of a contour map of Chennai at 
intervals of 10cm. It also embarked on a detailed GIS 
mapping of its drainage network at the zonal level, 
tracking the length and size of drains, the location of 
feeder drains, and the location of flashpoints. A senior 
city corporation official noted, 
“This is a major advance for us, as we can work on 
the drains in a more systematic way. Earlier, water 
would just go round and round in our drainage 
network without flushing out. We also know what 
HP pumps we need at which vulnerable points in 
the network – the right pumping power to match the 
points – so that water does not stagnate as it did the 
last time, for days. So, in engineering preparedness 
we are much better now. In terms of dealing with 
disaster, the corporation has become much better 
equipped in terms of knowledge and technology and 
capacity since the floods”.
3.4.1.2 Institutional strengthening, capacity 
building, and coordination 
Based on their analyses of gaps and failures, various 
state agencies undertook measures to strengthen 
their operations. The CMDA, which came under 
public criticism for the damage caused by widespread 
unauthorised constructions across the city, strongly 
defended the Chennai Master Plan’s provisions for flood 
prevention. A respondent from the agency said: 
“If you see our master plan, you will see that all 
the low-lying areas have been deferred for urban 
development. We have marked them for non-urban 
and agricultural uses. …all the eco-sensitive areas 
have been fully preserved”.
What the floods had emphasised, according to a 
senior planner from the CMDA, was the need for fuller 
and stricter implementation of the master plan. This 
included the need for creating detailed development 
plans and action plans for each area, and particularly 
for flood-prone areas, drawing from the master plan 
and supported by annual budgets. The responsibility 
for producing such action plans was with local bodies 
within the metropolitan area, who, according to this 
respondent, failed markedly in these respects. Senior 
planning experts blamed local bodies for implementation 
failures, as they granted building permissions that 
violated the provisions of the plan. These planners 
also emphasised the need to articulate area-specific 
development regulations, for instance, to disallow 
ground-floor construction (even for a generator room) 
in flood-prone areas and mandate that the ground floor 
should be kept as a stilt floor for parking, play areas, 
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or open space. This analysis was supported by a 
spokesperson of CREDAI, an association of large real 
estate developers, who laid the blame for the disaster 
at the door of unapproved constructions carried out by 
small informal builders. He insisted that in all approved 
constructions in low-lying areas, builders were required 
to raise the ground to a set minimum level: 
“There are records with the government showing 
which areas are lying close to the lakes, which are in 
low-lying areas. CMDA and DTCP have those plans. 
For any plan you have to go to the PWD and get an 
NOC. When you [do this], the PWD tells you that 
you have to raise it to this particular level. That gives 
you lot of safety”.
Another problem identified as responsible for 
construction in flood-prone areas was the disconnect 
between CMDA’s plans and developments occurring 
in smaller towns and municipalities in the urbanising 
peripheries of Chennai that came under the planning 
jurisdiction of the Directorate of Town and Country 
Planning (DTCP). The DTCP, according to senior 
planners in Chennai, lacked adequate expertise and 
capacity to develop plans that were ecologically 
sensitive.
Among the most recurrent themes that state officials 
emphasised as learnings from the 2015 floods was the 
need for better coordination at all levels, with most gaps 
and failures of the flood-relief effort attributed to lack of 
coordination. Senior personnel of the city corporation, 
for instance, pointed out that urban floods and disasters 
necessitated inter-departmental coordination among the 
Public Works, Highways and Revenue Departments, 
and in the case of Chennai, Metrowater. Many state 
officials pointed out that after the floods, senior officials 
such as the Secretary of the Municipal Administration 
and Water Supply (MAWS) Department had created 
a strong thrust on inter-agency coordination, calling for 
periodic consultations among all agencies and taking 
care to ensure that agencies maintained linkages on 
ongoing flood prevention measures. Respondents 
from all departments reported a marked increase in the 
number of inter-departmental coordination meetings 
on disaster preparedness had been held since 
December 2015, which had significantly strengthened 
mitigation efforts. 
An important innovation instituted after the floods was 
an infrastructure of inter-departmental zonal disaster 
response teams, headed by a zonal officer from the 
IAS, to be supported by a team of ‘first responders’. 
These teams would comprise mostly young community 
volunteers who could be mobilised to carry out 
immediate ground assessments at the moment of 
disaster and alert the zonal team, which would then 
proceed to decide on evacuation or relief measures 
needed. The Corporation of Chennai had issued a call 
for volunteers on its website and was in the process 
of registering volunteers, along with their details. 
Training for these volunteers by the Red Cross was 
being planned. The corporation has created a window 
for Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) to talk to 
the zonal commissioners. This system built on and 
extended the already existing monitoring structure for 
the NE monsoon that existed across the state, headed 
by the Principal Secretary of MAWS. In Chennai, this 
structure comprised an IAS officer who served as a 
zonal officer for each of the 15 zones. Across the state, 
district collectors had also been advised to rope in 
civil society and NGOs in building early warning and 
disaster preparedness systems. Many NGOs had also 
come forward proactively to help develop plans with 
the government. 
3.4.1.3 Flood-proofing and preventive actions
Various major and minor engineering interventions 
had been carried out by state and local government 
departments to prevent floods or mitigate their impacts. 
Major interventions included large storm-water drains 
constructed by the Corporation of Chennai in poorly 
drained areas like Velachery. An official commented: 
“That area was earlier like a water basin, holding all 
the water it received… The whole area is now being 
drained out through drains that are so large you can 
drive a car through them”. 
It should be noted that most of Velachery was 
constructed on a lake. Thus, mitigating actions of 
draining out a lake into the sea were being profiled as 
progressive measures. 
Minor interventions included desilting of waterways and 
waterbodies. Following the 2015 floods, a concerted 
inter-departmental flood-prevention drive was launched, 
comprising the desilting, cleaning and clearing of 
encroachments not only on waterbodies and waterways, 
but, for the first time, on the inlet and outlet channels. 
State-wide, a fund of �10 crores (approximately US$1.5 
million) had been sanctioned by the government for 
cleaning of river courses and another �100 crores 
(approximately US$15 million) for Kudimaramath 
(the traditional system of community maintenance of 
irrigation tanks and water bodies). Officials highlighted 
unprecedented actions that were being taken to desilt 
the Buckingham Canal and Ennore Creek. They also 
described large-scale efforts to remove vegetation, 
debris and other obstructions choking bridges and 
culverts on waterways. In vulnerable areas, these efforts 
extended up to 500 metres upstream and downstream 
of culverts. Numerous state departments, including 
highways, PWD, corporations, and local bodies had 
been directed to clear the bridges and culverts under 
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their jurisdiction. Official figures claimed that 15,800 
bridges and 1,43,500 culverts had been cleared across 
the state in 2016. There were also plans to redesign 
culverts from pipe to box type and to change the size 
of vents.
Other long-term strategies like the World Bank-funded 
Coastal Disaster Risk Reduction Programme (CDRRP) 
and the Comprehensive Flood Protection Plan were 
being developed. Government officials described these 
efforts as addressing multiple disaster risks: 
“Proper flood plans and strategies can by and large 
minimise drought risk as well, because they are about 
conserving and recharging water. … And wherever 
rainfall is deficient, we are working on building 
recharge structures like check dams, recharge pits, 
percolation ponds, and turning defunct bore wells 
into recharge wells—all this especially in and around 
water sources”. 
The SDMA described the disaster management strategy 
of the state as integrally tied to its development goals: 
“We are trying to mainstream disaster management 
into development plans. That is, whatever the 
development plans are doing should reduce risk. Or, 
if they do not reduce risk, at least they should not 
create more risks. Or if they do, the risk should be 
minimised”.
3.4.1.4 New understandings of urban ecologies
In the aftermath of the floods, state-level officials 
identified a set of administrative deficiencies that were 
responsible for the floods, including failure to maintain 
protocols in infrastructure building and maintenance. 
They identified the culpability of actions such as roads 
being built against the slope, the dumping of solid waste 
and debris into drains and waterbodies, and the failure 
to regularly desilt drains and waterways. 
The months after the flood also saw several discussions 
and deliberations held across all domains of civil society 
in Chennai, from educational institutions and social 
movements, to NGOs and business organisations. 
Our study identified a set of themes and concepts 
that seemed to emerge from these discussions as 
central lessons defining the future agenda for both the 
government and civil society. 
The first theme, which received city-wide public 
spotlight, was the role of waterbodies and 
floodplains in protecting the city from floods 
and drought, and the extent of their destruction over 
the past decades in the name of urban growth and 
development. Discussions in the public domain included 
historical mappings of encroachments on waterbodies 
resulting in their steady disappearance in the city, 
and examination of the roles and culpability of various 
government agencies as well as of civil society in these 
processes. They also addressed issues of land-use 
planning, zoning, and building violations. The discourse 
of disaster in Chennai thus came to comprise serious 
debates on the politics of urban ecology, on a scale 
that had rarely been witnessed in the city before. As 
one state-level government official pointed out, these 
discussions also encouraged citizens to take the onus 
for disaster preparedness on themselves: 
“People have realised the importance of waterbodies, 
and how to prepare themselves. In Velachery, even 
in smaller deluges, people used to evacuate. Now 
they stay. Associations work with engineers to clean 
channels. There is more cooperation between state 
and people. After 2015, people themselves are taking 
steps at prevention. Earlier they were not bothered. 
People are more prone now to come forward, and to 
work with government”.
Encroachment became a key focus after the floods. 
The term had been associated almost exclusively with 
informal settlements of the poor, in the usage of both 
the government and the larger public. This allowed the 
government to present eviction of these settlements, 
which had long been part of a dominant agenda of 
urban renewal, as a post-flood rescue and rehabilitation 
measure. However, discussions in the press and in 
various civil society platforms attacked this selective 
usage, and pointed to large numbers of elite and state 
encroachments that had revealed more damaging 
effects on the flood ecologies of the city than the 
informal settlements on the river banks (Coelho 2016, 
Jayaraman 2016, Jayaraman 2016). 
Government officials acknowledged that several 
encroachments on the river banks were by large elite 
institutions, but claimed that these encroachments were 
difficult to evict as they had legal title (or ‘patta’) for their 
lands. When asked why the large mall called Ampa 
Skywalk constructed on the edge of the River Cooum 
was not being demolished, a key informant from CRRT 
pointed out, 
“Yes, it is right on the edge of the river, but patta was 
given by the Revenue Department. So we cannot say 
it is an encroachment because it is on patta land”. 
A senior official of the SDMA when asked about the 
selective demolition of encroachments said, 
“Defects and gaps will always be there, but the larger 
effort is going on. For the poor, resettlement and 
rehabilitation is being addressed”. 
Both officials cited the 2005 court-ordered demolition 
of parts of the elite MGR University that had been 
located on poromboke (government common) lands 
belonging to the Cooum River, as an example of the 
willingness of state agencies to take action against large 
encroachers. 
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State officials from revenue and land-owning 
departments also expressed awareness that 
resettlement of poor families living on the edges of 
waterways was not a straightforward matter: 
“Removal of encroachments is a sensitive issue, 
as it involves humanitarian concerns, which we are 
also more aware of now. These issues may delay 
the process. Of course for us there is a focus and 
an urge to evict, because these encroachments are 
a problem for the larger area as their actions are 
disturbing the larger community”. 
Government agencies were also forced to rethink the 
nature of their restoration plans. For instance, restoration 
plans for the River Cooum in Chennai had earlier 
included large components of river-front beautification 
and commercial development. However, a key informant 
from the Chennai River Restoration Trust interviewed 
after the floods claimed that these agendas had been 
de-emphasised in current river restoration plans: 
“This is flood management – restoring the original 
design of the river. We will not compromise on river 
width. They [not clear who this referred to] were 
asking for space for hotels and entertainment areas, 
but we said, ‘No, we are removing people from 
here to restore the river, why would be bring more 
construction on the banks?’ The PWD said they 
would not give even a single inch of river land for 
any purpose”. 
3.4.1.5 Improvements in resettlement 
processes
The post-flood resettlement of families evicted from 
river banks was carried out with care and sensitivity to 
the fact that the people had suffered enormous losses, 
and were in a troubled ‘state of mind’ (KII, TNSCB 
Community Development Wing). 
A priori preparations made two years earlier for 
the removal of informal housing from the banks of 
waterways in Chennai helped significantly. A TNSCB 
official highlighted that a major factor facilitating this was 
the availability of enumeration data on households to be 
resettled, from the RAY survey of 2014. 
“So, fortunately we had the list of people living 
along the Adyar river…. (Given) their state of mind, 
it would not be right to ask (about their tenure in the 
area) because they have lost their ration card, voter 
id, everything had been washed off” (KII, TNSCB 
official). 
Three state agencies were coordinated the resettlement 
process. The RAY enumeration, carried out by the 
corporation, had identified 36 slums along the Adyar 
River to be evicted and resettled. From these, 28 slums 
were shortlisted as most affected by the floods. The 
corporation verified and de-duplicated beneficiary 
lists with biometric identification data they collected. 
The PWD and the corporation, responsible for the 
maintenance of major and minor waterways respectively 
and therefore the ‘land-owning agencies’ in this context, 
earmarked the boundaries and extent of land to be 
cleared for waterway restoration. The role of TNSCB 
was to implement the resettlement to the colonies it 
had built. Teams were formed representing the three 
agencies, to liaise with the families to be relocated. 
According to TNSCB officials, there was some 
resistance to resettlement. Families living in temporary 
shacks on the river edge were ready to move, while 
those who lived in concrete structures, some of them, 
more than one storey, resisted the move. In addition, 
slums closer to Adyar, like Mallipoo Nagar, refused 
to move. TNSCB officials, however, contended that 
problems within these slums meant that a few powerful 
interests prevented large numbers of eligible families 
from claiming resettlement tokens. Resettlement tokens 
were intended for families who could produce evidence 
of having resided in the slums for several years. 
However, according to officials, many families were 
tenants and could not make claims as their ‘landlords’ 
ensured that they did not have any documentation for 
their residence. 
“This is the maximum vulnerability (of many rental 
residents)—that the (house) owner will not allow a 
renter (to benefit from the resettlement scheme), 
although they are taking �1000 or �3000 from them.” 
Consequently, ‘house owners’ claimed several 
allotments by producing documentation for houses in 
their relative’s names. 
The post-flood resettlement package, based on a 
government order (GO), was generous in comparison 
with the protocols of eviction and resettlement for 
infrastructure or other projects. There is no resettlement 
policy for the state, and the agency usually follows the 
provisions of the Slum Clearance Act of 1971. The 
agency had made efforts to ease the move by providing 
a shifting allowance of �5,000 per family, even though 
the corporation provided transport facilities for the move 
in most cases. In addition, a subsistence allowance of 
�2,500 per month for one year was sanctioned for each 
family, and the community development wing assisted 
families to open bank accounts where this amount 
would be transferred. Families were given the key to the 
new house along with the shifting allowance as soon as 
they entered. The monthly maintenance fee collected 
by the TNSCB in Perumbakkam, however, was �750 
(approximately US$12), much higher than in other 
resettlement colonies. This was for maintaining the lift, 
including provision of a back-up generator.
Arrangements were made for the prompt transfer of 
ration cards. All relevant departments were present at 
the site to assist with a smooth transition, and there 
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was significant coordination among line departments 
in this move. School admissions were facilitated, with 
school principals or authorities seated at the site during 
the shift, ready to register students based on the class 
they had been enrolled in before the move, without 
demanding evidence of study. A medical camp was also 
organised at the site. Care was taken that if there were 
aged or chronically ill people in a household, they would 
be allotted a ground floor house. Two months later, a 
large job fair was organised by the TNSCB.
There were also efforts to form watch committees and 
sanitation committees. Collaborations were built with 
NGOs to provide education on health and sanitation. 
Although Perumbakkam is outside the boundaries of 
the Chennai Municipal Corporation (CMC), a decision 
was taken by the government that the corporation 
would extend services such as water and sanitation 
to Perumbakkam. The apartments now have piped 
water and toilets inside. The aim was to ultimately form 
associations which would represent each block, and 
take up responsibilities for maintaining the blocks. 
3.4.2 Lessons from individuals and 
community groups
The tsunami contributed to strengthening early warning 
systems, particularly in coastal areas. An SDMA official 
claimed that it had also resulted in greater heed being 
paid to forewarnings by the administration. Yet, the flood 
warnings of December 2015 were reportedly largely 
ineffective. Our interviews with households that had 
been living on the banks of the Adyar River at the time 
of the floods provided some insights into how families 
located in vulnerable areas reacted to early warnings 
of disaster. 
Many of these families acknowledged that they had 
received official warnings of the floods and been 
advised to evacuate. However, the warnings did not 
have the intended effects for several reasons. Flooding 
was a routine occurrence in these areas, and people 
usually waited to gauge its intensity before deciding 
to move to temporary shelters. Families who lived on 
elevated parts of the banks felt secure that they would 
not be inundated. Repeated flood warnings had been 
issued from as early as November, which reduced 
the perceived seriousness of the warning. Almost 
unanimously, respondents claimed that they had never 
expected or experienced a flood of this magnitude. And 
finally, the warnings were related to rain-based floods, 
but the opening of the Chembarambakkam dam, which 
caused the disastrous early morning inundation of 
3 December, was not in the equation. 
One respondent recalled that relief centres had filled up 
by the time they were evacuated: 
“The RI [Revenue Inspector] came and cautioned us 
around 5:30pm that the people on the banks should 
vacate immediately to save their lives. Around 3am 
the floods hit and washed away everything. Since the 
places arranged by the government for the victims 
were all full, we rented rooms in a lodge on the main 
road and checked in around 12:00pm” (PBM/H/01). 
Some families, however, claimed that they were not 
given clear instructions to evacuate: 
“We were warned that there might be floods… but 
they never told us to evacuate, or never told us it 
will be this bad. At midnight a police van came and 
rushed us out” (PMB/AIB/06). 
Families residing in flood-prone areas had long learned 
to prioritise their identity and other documents over all 
other possessions in preparation for floods. As one 
recalled: 
“We were told earlier that there are going to be 
floods, so I had already packed all IDs, and when we 
were asked to move out, I just took this bag with the 
IDs and left. I did not even carry any clothes with me” 
(PMB/AIB/05). 
Another respondent said: 
“Before the flood, the police gave us warning, so 
we were safely staying in Anna Gem school during 
the flood in the last week of November. But during 
the second massive flood we didn’t receive any 
warning about the release of water from the dam. 
At the last minute we got the information and we 
saved important documents and things, but still some 
documents were washed away” (PBM/H/02). 
The last minute evacuation had resulted in substantial 
losses to their property, including livestock. As one 
household reported: 
“We all stayed at Anna Gem school for 15 days. We 
did not carry anything with us. We were evacuated 
at 12 at midnight and we only safeguarded our lives. 
Our goats and hens died” (PMB/AIB/06).
When asked what they had learned from the experience, 
respondents from these families focused mainly on the 
risks to their lives: 
“We can’t do anything (if flood comes again). We 
have to face it. We will save our lives and move to a 
safer place” (PMB/AIB/05). 
“The only thing we learnt from the tsunami is to save 
our lives. During floods, water came up until the fifth 
step and we were really worried about what to do if 
the water came to the top floor. Then we decided, if 
that happens, we will first save our lives. We would 
go to our terrace and stay. Actually, there was no way 
to go up to the terrace but after the floods, we have 
got a ladder so that we can go up and stay if there 
are such events” (SMY/AIB/06).
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3.4.3 Gaps and margins
The sustainability of the learnings and actions provoked 
by the floods of 2015 came under serious question a 
year after the disaster. A longer-term perspective on 
the government’s response to floods reveals that the 
widespread convergence of attention and efforts on the 
restoration of waterbodies and waterways was seen 
after the floods of 2005 in Chennai. Yet, the intervening 
decade had seen, if anything, an increase in unplanned 
and unofficially sanctioned urbanisation of sensitive 
floodplains and marshes on the southern edges of 
the city, uncontrolled construction on waterways, and 
ongoing pollution and siltation of waterbodies. 
An example of the shallowness of the government’s 
disaster-proofing actions is seen in the highly publicised 
clean-up of the Buckingham Canal in its northern 
reaches near the Ennore Creek. This clean-up was 
provoked by the sustained campaign of environmental 
activists and fisher communities from the Ennore 
region, who argued that the choked state of the 
canal posed serious threats of flooding during the 
2016 monsoons. However, these monsoons were 
accompanied by cyclonic activity, but not much rainfall. 
By February 2017, the threat of flooding had passed, 
and the cleaned sections of the canal had returned to 
their original polluted state. Thus, while the clean-up 
was an opportunity for the state to demonstrate its 
responsiveness to disaster risks, the medium and longer 
term saw a return to business as usual. 
In other cases, longer-term urban development agendas 
were presented as disaster mitigation measures. For 
instance, a tender to prepare the master plan was 
announced in 2013 and, according to a representative 
of CRRT, had been prepared by 2015, although it had 
not been publicly released. The plan identified 200 
lakes, of which 38 were prioritised for restoration on the 
Box 3. puttIng At RISk tHE HEALtH of poSt-fLooD 
SAnItARy SERvICES pRovIDERS
Offsetting the state’s success in averting disease 
outbreaks after the floods was its near-disastrous 
handling of the health and disease exposure of 
10,000 sanitation workers that had been brought 
in from other parts of the state to clean the city 
immediately following the floods. 
The workers were sent in batches, each municipality 
sending 20 per week. The emergency situation in 
which these workers were recruited and deployed 
meant that there was no thought or planning given to 
the health and safety of the workers themselves. They 
were housed in schools, which lacked bathing and 
washing facilities to clean themselves after returning 
from their work. No kitchen arrangements were 
made for them; they either used the small allowances 
provided to eat at hotels, or skipped meals. The 
supply of gloves, masks, and boots was woefully 
short, hence only senior male workers could use them, 
while females and younger workers worked without 
any protection to clean drains choked with sewage, 
garbage, and a variety of hazardous wastes. 
There was little coordination among departments to 
oversee the safety and health of these workers. While 
the state DPH was unaware of the living arrangements 
of these workers, the CMC had no health plan for 
them. It was only after two to three weeks, as the 
programme was winding down, that any systems 
came into place. The only system devised was that 
whenever any of the mobile clinics deployed by the 
DPH came across one of these workers, they would 
attend to them, ensure they had gloves and administer 
immunisation to them. This was at best an ad hoc 
arrangement. The best that could be done in a bad 
situation but it was ad hoc. “Ideally the workers 
should receive all this as they come in”, observed a 
medical volunteer. 
What made this riskier was that many of these 
workers were not working as cleaning staff in their 
source locations, and hence were neither trained 
for nor accustomed to such work, making them less 
able to adapt to the demands of the job in a crisis 
situation and thus highly vulnerable to disease. The 
workers were brought in as a headcount, with no 
documentation of who came from where and where 
they went back to after they finished work, making it 
difficult for health teams to follow up on their health 
outcomes once they had returned. 
While serious concerns were raised about 
these issues by a group of medical volunteers in 
Chennai after the floods, there was practically no 
documentation of the effects to inform any future 
action. The care and protection of service providers 
that intervene in post-crisis situations is an issue 
that remains neglected. Key informants in our study 
recalled that there were medical teams that returned 
from the tsunami-affected areas in 2004 with signs of 
mental trauma, but no concerted attention was paid to 
this issue.
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basis of being free of heavy encroachment and not used 
for irrigation. 
“Our restoration would be in terms of preventing 
the entry of sewage water, preventing dumping of 
garbage and debris, creating pathways, fencing 
and vegetation around it so that the lake will not 
be encroached in the future. The idea is to protect 
the lake in a sustainable way… to act as a buffer to 
receive storm water and recharge groundwater. So 
although this is not disaster management at present, 
these measures will prevent future disasters like 
floods as well as water shortages.”
Yet, the lakes prioritised for restoration were not 
those that triggered the floods in 2015. Adambakkam, 
Thazhambur and Perumbakkam lakes had breached 
their banks and were the cause of very heavy flooding in 
the southern sections of the city in December 2015. But 
the CRRT’s selection criteria emphasised the feasibility 
of restoration, which precluded lakes where there was 
heavy encroachment. 
“For example, Medavakkam, Adambakkam are 
dumped on and fully encroached, we would be 
dealing there mostly with social issues. The channels 
are so blocked that water does not reach the lake. 
…Here the threat of floods is severe. [But] we have 
not taken these lakes on our list. … [Perumbakkam 
and Thazhambur] lakes got breached because the 
encroachers on the lakes broke the bunds. Now more 
teams have been appointed to monitor those areas. 
We are concentrating on three to four lakes in north 
Chennai. And our list, which was made in 2015, 
focused on high-density areas, whereas those were 
open areas at the time.” 
In general, the actions taken by the state, even when 
they went beyond business-as-usual, revealed a 
reluctance to undertake robust disaster-proofing 
measures.
Activist and civil society key informants also identified 
a range of gaps that pointed to the limitations in 
the state’s efforts at coordination and consultation, 
evidence-based policymaking, and transparency. 
First, innovative and effective systems that had been 
deployed during the floods were not replicated across 
state agencies during the disaster response period, 
nor were they incorporated into ongoing protocols for 
future response or mitigation efforts. Activists who 
had worked closely with government departments 
during the floods observed that simply holding inter-
departmental meetings could not produce coordination 
in an institutional culture where functionaries were most 
comfortable operating within their silos. Consequently, 
some effective work done by innovative individuals or 
groups, whether in state or civil society domains, during 
and immediately after the disaster, remained isolated in 
those moments and spaces (see for example Boxes 1 
and 2 on health implications). 
Civil society activists who had conducted a social audit 
and a public hearing on losses and damages during 
the floods claimed that the state had made little effort 
after the disaster to consolidate learning from their 
experiences: 
“The government [should] come up with a learning 
document from these floods. We asked the 
government if there is any such document, but they 
said that they didn’t have any. After we did the social 
audit and the public hearing, we were once called 
by the corporation to talk about the issues that we 
had raised. But apart from that … we have seen 
absolutely no action and no consultation by the 
government” (KII_NGO, December 2016). 
Indeed, learnings about disaster management over the 
long run appear to have been sparse. An activist from 
an organisation that had built substantial experience in 
post-disaster intervention commented: 
“As a group of people, or even the government, we 
have not learnt anything from previous disasters. I 
feel we are apprehensive about learning. This would 
reveal how unprepared we are, which makes us 
insecure. If a tsunami occurs tomorrow, we still won’t 
know what to do”. 
Another activist who had taken an active role in 
humanitarian action during and after the tsunami 
corroborated this. She asserted that ten years after the 
tsunami would be a good time to revisit the tsunami-
affected areas and assess the actions taken, but no 
such effort had been undertaken: 
“… [T]he NGO’s wouldn’t dare to go back to look 
at what they have done. Maybe there are a few who 
did well. But a lot of it was problematic. The state 
also does not take learnings from different places, for 
example Gujarat and apply them in Nagapattinam. 
They keep reinventing the wheel because it works for 
them”. 
Even state officials commented on the failure to develop 
systematic learnings or standard protocols for disaster 
management: 
“SOPs do not exist – we should have manuals for 
people – for floods, droughts, earthquakes, cyclones. 
What to do when there is no current, no water, 
whom to approach. After the floods, how to prevent 
diseases. What to do if sewage has got mixed with 
water” (KII_Gov, November 2016). 
Despite the state’s emphasis on data collection and 
documentation to analyse and prevent future disasters, 
activists also identified several key areas where 
information was deliberately suppressed to avert a 
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perception of crisis (See Boxes 2 and 3 for more details 
on health outcomes).
Another activist observed: 
“There are some inherent problems with the rescue 
and relief infrastructure. I think there are 35 fire 
and rescue stations in Chennai …and I think each 
police station could at least be equipped with little 
infrastructure. Very clearly, the city has a lot of young 
people who are willing and are able to do a lot, with 
no training from the ground. Just imagine if they had 
actually been trained. They would have been able 
to help even with rescue efforts. Rescue efforts are 
more difficult, especially in a flood like situation… 
Only the fishermen and the army could do it”. 
Another activist noted that the government had leaned 
heavily on volunteer efforts for rescue: 
“…[But] none of the volunteer groups were trained 
enough to do rescue. You can’t ask anyone like me or 
… anyone who wants to volunteer to go and rescue, 
but people were willing to go. Unfortunately, they had 
to stop them because … without experience, if you 
get in… we lost two lives. Two volunteers died in the 
rescue process. They were not equipped in this”. 
While most commentators acknowledged that the scale 
of the disaster exceeded the government’s capacity 
to respond, the baseline inadequacy in capacity and 
coordination was also exposed by the disaster. 
Moreover, we found that marginalisation of resettlement 
colonies by government agencies still continues. 
Despite unique vulnerabilities faced by the resettlement 
colonies, there is little evidence of any recognition, 
assessment, or discussion on the challenges in these 
colonies during disasters. Respondents listed various 
efforts undertaken to flood proof the city such as 
physical measures such as building, expanding or 
repairing storm water drains and restoring waterbodies 
and their channels, and social/institutional efforts such 
as enhancing inter-agency coordination and establishing 
platforms for citizen-led ‘first response’ systems. 
However, while these efforts were clearly needed, the 
settlements appeared to be left out of city-wide disaster-
proofing efforts. 
For instance, while it was the breaching and overflowing 
of the Perumbakkam and Thazhambur lakes that 
caused the severe flooding in both Semmencherry and 
Perumbakkam, these lakes did not figure on the list of 
waterbodies identified by the CRRT for desilting and 
restoration. Efforts to create volunteer platforms for 
disaster response had not been extended to places 
such as Semmencherry. 
While several NGOs and civil society groups in Chennai 
were called in for consultations on how to prepare for 
disasters, Thozhamai, one of the most active NGOs in 
Semmencherry, reported that it was not called for any 
consultation. In fact, Thozhamai called for two meetings 
with residents and various state agencies – from the 
PDS, the PHC, the police, and the TNSCB – after the 
floods, but no government official attended.
In sum, this chapter has highlighted the following points: 
• The dimensions and determinants of vulnerability to 
disaster risk are contextual and complex. They not 
only vary by the type of disaster, but are shaped by 
a host of factors, including histories of state policy 
on urban housing and settlement, social structures 
of caste, class and gender, and most importantly, 
patterns of institutional discrimination in services 
and amenities among different sections of the urban 
population. Families relocated by the government to 
resettlement colonies on the peripheries of the city 
revealed multiple converging aspects of vulnerability 
to disaster risk. However, the government’s analysis 
of vulnerability remains focused on technical 
parameters, failing to recognise the socioeconomic 
and institutional processes that render particular 
sections more vulnerable to strong impacts from 
extreme events.
• The discourse of new understandings and lessons 
learned, as articulated by state agencies and 
officials remained shallow. These learnings had not 
succeeded in bringing about substantial changes 
in state action in terms of urban development plans, 
policies, and projects after the immediate post-flood 
period, perhaps because of the lack of catalysts for 
deep change such as change in leadership, amended 
legislature, or institutional shifts. 
• Important opportunities for recognising, learning 
from, and institutionalising innovations and positive 
experiences from civil society actions during the 2015 
floods and the 2004 tsunami were not taken up by 
the state. 
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4 
Conclusion
We started out trying to understand the long-term 
implications of immediate humanitarian action in 
urban areas. Using Chennai city as a site illustrative of 
facing multiple risks (exposed to various environmental 
hazards, seeing rapid urbanisation, increasing pressure 
on existing resources and services), we examined 
humanitarian action in the city post major disasters: The 
Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 and the extreme flood 
event of 2015. Separated by more than a decade, we 
examined the mix of humanitarian actors and nature 
of humanitarian action after and in between these two 
events. Our findings are sobering with a few sparks 
of hope. 
The different hazard events that Chennai has seen over 
the past decade reveal distinct patterns of impact and 
varied responses from humanitarian actors. While the 
tsunami was short-lived, lasting only for a few hours, 
the floods of 2015 endured for several days. Yet, the 
tsunami attracted much more international attention 
and assistance than the floods, perhaps owing to its 
international scale of impact and the scale of loss of life 
and other damage suffered. The floods, despite their 
intensity, were perceived as more a ‘regular’ occurrence 
and seen as a local issue. 
We find that multiple actors carried out disaster 
relief (with more international NGO presence in the 
tsunami) and their actions are highly varied – within 
the government, different agencies deliver to different 
degrees and in different ways; within civil society, 
motivations to undertake disaster management is 
multifarious, with varying results. In some positive 
cases such as the Chennai Rain Relief, different actors 
come together to provide useful relief, in other cases, 
mismanagement, redundancy, poorly defined operating 
guidelines, inadequate data, and fuzzy decision making 
constrain relief efforts. 
We started with a thesis that disaster responses 
are based on different actors’ prior commitments 
and agendas. These agendas shape their extent of 
involvement in and processes undertaken towards 
humanitarian action. We find that while the experience 
of the tsunami helped build resources and capacities for 
disaster management in multiple ways, the experience 
of extreme events changed institutional pathways and 
processes of operating among humanitarian actors 
to different degrees. Disasters can thus, often jolt 
the system out of the business-as-usual pathway and 
provide opportunities to innovate, gain mileage, or 
create new partnerships. We also, on the contrary, 
found that for the vulnerable groups and systems, 
the impacts of disasters are disproportionately 
larger, and are made worse by post-disaster actions 
and interventions. 
The government, despite the scale of resources and 
disaster management infrastructure it had built up 
since 2005 (following the tsunami and establishment 
of the State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA) 
in 2005) displayed relatively low preparedness and 
capacity for handling large-scale disaster. Barring 
some pockets of energetic and innovative action from 
individual representatives of government agencies, the 
overall institutional machinery was overwhelmed by 
the scale of the 2015 floods. Inbuilt characteristics of 
government functioning in the given context, including 
poor coordination across agencies and departments, 
inflexible operating procedures, and constraints to 
innovation also curtailed the government’s ability to 
respond effectively to the floods, even in comparison 
with civil society efforts. 
Although humanitarian actions by NGOs and civil 
society were limited in scale and reach, three factors 
contributed to the relative effectiveness of their relief 
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interventions. First, most organisations used their 
grassroots relationships and knowledge to target 
assistance, often much more effectively than the 
state was able to do. Second, non-governmental 
actions were guided by a few groups that had proven 
expertise in responding to disasters and leveraged 
their learnings and experiences from other contexts to 
establish effective protocols from the start. Third, strong 
coordination and collaboration across many NGOs was 
achieved through a few platforms that sprang up in the 
city, to receive and store relief supplies, package them, 
and receive requests for relief.
What also emerged from the actor-mapping exercise 
was that although patterns of overlaps and coordination 
among these groups were observed during and in the 
immediate aftermath of the floods of 2015, government 
and civil society actors worked in relatively separate 
spheres, with few instances of partnership. 
We found that there have been some lessons from 
the tsunami which have helped humanitarian actors 
deal more effectively with recent flooding. Initiatives 
were set up to establish networking and collaboration 
among state agencies, international donors, NGOs, 
and citizens. Consultations were held, and experts 
from numerous countries and sectors were brought 
together to pool knowledge and learnings. One such 
initiative was the Tamil Nadu Tsunami Resource 
Centre (TNTRC), which aimed to consolidate and 
advance the process of learning and building disaster-
preparedness in the state. KIIs informed us that the 
TNTRC has eventually become dormant because of 
lack of commitment from government, including funding, 
appropriately skilled staff, and a sustainable continuity 
plan (tsunami being a low frequency event).
However, several critical gaps remain – such as 
continued views that reducing exposure to risk can 
be solved by relocating vulnerable communities. 
Such static views of exposure and vulnerability 
ignore conceptual and empirical advances in the 
disaster management discourse which argues for a 
multidimensional understanding of vulnerability which 
is contextual and dynamic. The second glaring gap is 
the government’s continued blindness to the impact of 
broader development processes and investments on 
risk creation and consolidation, at the watershed, city, 
settlement, and household levels. 
The 2015 floods however, highlighted the inadequacy 
of the measures that had been adopted over the 
past decade, and of the overall state of disaster 
preparedness in Tamil Nadu. Thus, the floods were 
presented by government agencies as a new landmark 
in disaster-related learning and governance. This 
raises critical questions about institutional memory and 
sustainability of learnings for disaster preparedness in 
the state, and why the ‘wake-up call’, as the tsunami was 
reported, did not last after 2004. 
Drawing on the specific cases of post-disaster 
relocation, we demonstrated how disasters impact 
multiple facets of peoples’ lives and livelihoods. These 
cases, rooted in empirical evidence and rich in personal 
narratives, showcase how the physical manifestations of 
disaster impacts – broken houses, loss in assets –are 
often outweighed by the psychosocial impacts and 
breaks in kinship and day-to-day ties. 
Finally, we examined the impacts of humanitarian 
action itself on a longer timescale – moving beyond the 
immediate to uncover cascading effects of relief and 
relocation, both on resettled families, as well as on the 
city. At both scales, we found dissonances between 
intent and action, but the range of experiences and 
outcomes of humanitarian action are critical to highlight. 
While most families interviewed narrated poor living 
conditions, inadequate access to basic services, and 
unsafe living conditions post relocation, there were 
some instances of improved living conditions with 
further improvements through better infrastructure and 
services over time. However, at the city scale, no such 
silver linings were found. Unplanned urbanisation and 
a development agenda devoid of ecological empathy 
has and continues to make Chennai’s people and 
ecosystems severely vulnerable. 
In conclusion, we highlighted that Chennai’s 
geographical location predisposes it to certain 
environmental hazards. Typical of India’s metropolises, 
Chennai too is seeing tremendous growth and 
consequently, burgeoning pressures on its resources. 
Its current governance regime, characterised by 
many of the conditions seen in other large Indian 
cities, is crippled by a unidimensional understanding 
of vulnerability and risk creation and accumulation, 
inadequate capacity and lack of leadership to put in 
place institutional systems and procedures towards 
effective disaster management (relief, impact 
mitigation, preparation, etc.), and a narrow vision 
about how current development decisions (of which 
relocation as humanitarian action is one) are locking 
the city’s growth into unsustainable and inequitable 
development pathway. 
It will take concerted actions from policymakers, NGOs, 
civil society and concerned citizens to find and finance 
creative solutions to undermine the risks created and 
perpetuated by the current development trajectory and 
hold the state accountable to more forward-looking, 
adaptive planning in the coming years. 
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Summary of findings from 
household interviews
After the reconnaissance visits, relocation sites of Kannaginagar, Semmencherry and Perumbakkam were identified 
as the study sites. All three sites are located within the wetland of Pallikarnai marsh. 
In the three selected sites, two kinds of respondents were identified: i) affected households (HHs) who were 
relocated to Kannaginagar and Semmencherry after the tsunami in 2004; and ii) affected HHs who were relocated 
to Kannaginagar and Perumbakkam after the recent floods in 2015. A simple random sampling method was used 
and a total of 55 HHs were interviewed as part of the study. Of the total 55 responders, 50 HHs have allotted/
registered units and 5 HHs were renting units at the time of the survey in the government-built housing units. Of the 
total 5 HHs who were renting, 3 HHs were tsunami-affected families, but have not received the allotment and have 
relocated to be part of the community, and the other 2 HHs are regular renters. 
Of the total 55 HHs, 23 HHs are from Kannaginagar, 16 HHs each from Perumbakkam and Semmencherry. In 
Kannaginagar, 16 were families relocated after the tsunami (KNG-T) and 5 HHs were relocated after the 2015 
December floods. All the HHs surveyed in Semmencherry were relocated after the tsunami and all HHs surveyed 
in Perumbakkam were relocated after the floods. See Table A1 for the sample description. The listed labels are 
used (along with an acronym for the interviewee) throughout the report to refer to the semi-structured interviews 
(SSIs) with the respective households. 
In the sample, none of the families who moved after the floods experienced the tsunami in 2004, because of their 
location on the banks of Adyar away from the coast. Whereas the families who suffered the traumatic experience of 
tsunami also experienced floods in the sites to which they were relocated.
Table A1: Sample description by location and type of responders
SItE RELoCAtIon typE LABELS totAL
Allottees 50
Kannaginagar
Post 2015 floods 
KNG-F  5
Perumbakkam PMB-F 16
Kannaginagar
Post 2004 tsunami
KNG-T 16
Semmencherry SMY-T 13
Renters  5
Kannaginagar
Post 2004 tsunami 
KNG-T  2
Semmencherry SMY-T  3
Total 55
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We found that the process of relocation was implemented immediately (one to two months) after the floods 
in 2015. However, the relocation process after the tsunami continued for many years. In the relocation sites of 
Kannaginagar and Perumbakkam, most families were relocated from the river banks of the Adyar in the areas of 
Saidapet and Surya Nagar. In the housing built for those affected by the tsunami, most families were relocated from 
the coastal areas of Santhome and Pattinampakkam. 
Table A2: Location and time of move post disaster by type of responders
LoCAtIon AnD tIME fRoM MovIng kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Allottees 5 16 16 13 50
1–2 months 5 16  8  1 30
Santhome  8 8
Surya Nagar 12 12
Pattinampakkam  1 1
Jyothi Nagar  1 1
Little Mount  3 3
Saidapet 5 5
Less than a year  6  9 15
Santhome  6  1 9
Pattinampakkam  4 4
Besant Nagar 1 1
Odakuppam 1 1
1–5 years  2 3 5
Santhome  1 1 2
Pattinampakkam  1 1 2
Besant Nagar 1 1
Renters  2 3 5
1–2 months 1 1
Pattinampakkam 1 1
Less than a year  1 1
Santhome  1 1
More than 5 years  1 2 3
Besant Nagar  1 1
Thiruvanamalai 1 1
Triplecane 1 1
Within the sample, 95 per cent of the families had lived for more than ten years in their previous location before 
they were relocated. 
Table A3: Number of years of stay in previous location before relocation
tIME of StAy In pREvIouS LoCAtIon kng-f kng-t pMB-f SMy-t totAL
Allottees 5 16 16 13 50
1–5 years 1 1 2 4
6–10 years 1 1
More than 10 years 5 15 15 10 45
Renters 2 3 5
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We found that the majority of the housing stock was already built and ready when the disaster occurred. The 
housing was allocated right after the disaster, except in the case of Semmencherry, which was constructed after 
the tsunami, and the relocation process took much longer. This highlights the potential mismatch of housing 
provision, and the specific needs of the beneficiaries identified for relocation in this pre-constructed housing, and it 
also has implications for any kind of participation by the affected communities in the housing project design. 
A majority of the respondents said that they did not get enough notice before they were forcefully moved. Within a 
few days and weeks of the floods and tsunami, they were moved to these sites. However, during the surveys, a few 
respondents said that before the floods, the government had officially informed them that the housing units were 
ready for occupation and that the families could move in when they wanted. But none of the families were willing as 
the units were located far away from the city. 
Table A4: Time of notice before eviction
notICE BEfoRE EvICtIon kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Less than a day 4 2 2 8
Less than a week 3 6 10 1 20
Less than a month 4 3 4 11
A few months 3 3
More than a year 2 2 1 1 6
Don’t know can’t say (DKCS)/ Did not ask (DNA) 1 1 3
Of the families surveyed under this study, all the HHs either moved as part of or with the whole community (except 
the two renters who moved from Thiruvanamalai and Triplecane). The renters who moved from Pattinampakkam, 
Santhome along with the community have continued to rent as they were not allotted a house. The renter who 
moved from Besant Nagar said that she was initially staying in a temporary structure in Semmencherry, and as they 
had evicted her from there, she moved to Kannaginagar and has been renting for the last five years. 
Table A5: Continuity of the original community networks
MovIng wItH CoMMunIty oR ALonE kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Allottee 5 16 16 13 50
Part of the original community 1 1 2
As entire community 5 16 15 12 48
Renters 2 3 5
As entire community 1 2 3
Family alone 1 1 2
The average number of family members is four across all sites. Most of the families are nuclear in nature, and of 
the total 55 HHs, four HHs have six or more members within one family. When asked if the provided housing units 
had sufficient space for the families, 44 responders said that it was not sufficient. The allotted housing designs 
vary across projects built in different time periods. The housing units that were built in the early 2000s which 
were allotted to tsunami-affected families in Kannaginagar and Semmencherry are ground+1 structures, and 
each individual unit contains one room per unit, a shared toilet and bath between two units. Later, the design was 
changed to ground+2 and each individual unit contains one room, one bedroom and an attached toilet. 
The housing units that were allocated recently to the flood affected families are ground+3 blocks in Kannaginagar 
and ground+13 tenement blocks in Perumbakkam. These units also follow a similar design, where an individual unit 
has one room, one bedroom, and an attached toilet.
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Families in Kannaginagar, who had received houses in the first phase of allotments, complained about lack of 
space. Female members of the family complained about lack of privacy as they had to share a toilet with other 
families and said that some women have committed suicide because of these reasons. 
Table A6: Sample description: number of family members in the survey sample
nuMBER of fAMILy MEMBERS kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
1 4 1 1 6
2 1 6 1 1 9
3 2 2 1 3 8
4 1 2 6 8 17
5 1 2 6 2 11
6 2 2
More than 6 1 1 2
Table A7: Sample description: number of family members in the survey sample
SuffICIEnt SpACE In tHE ALLottED 
HouSE
kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Yes 3 5 2 10
No 2 10 18 14 44
DNA 1 1
A majority of the surveyed sample were predominantly female-headed households or jointly-headed households. 
We assessed the head of family by asking ‘who took the important decisions in the household?’. Although, the 
majority of houses are allotted in women’s name, and there is a significant increase in this number when compared 
to the situation before relocation. 
Table A8: Head of the family in the surveyed sample by gender
HEAD of tHE fAMILy kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Male 8 4 7 19
Female 3 6 6 7 22
Both male and female 2 2 8 2 14
Table A9: Allotment certificates of the relocated site by genders
on wHoSE nAME tHE ALLotMEnt 
CERtIfICAtE In tHE RELoCAtIon SItE 
kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Yes 5 16 16 13 50
Male 1 6 2 3 12
Female 4 9 7 9 29
Both 1 7 1 9
Rent 2 3 5
Table A10: Number of HHs with patta before relocation
HHS wItH patta BEfoRE RELoCAtIon kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Yes 3 8 11 7 29
No 2 8 7 5 22
Rent 4 4
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The predominant level of education in both male and females is up to matriculation or class 10. The reasons for 
dropping out of the school after relocation were not explored in detail as part of this study. Some respondents 
attributed it to the lack of educational facilities in the proximity post relocation. While the older generations were 
not well educated, the conditions in the relocated site are such that the younger generations might also suffer from 
a lack of access to facilities, or may face a break from school for years until facilities are provided. Safety for girls is 
also an issue that was mentioned during the conversations. 
Table A11: Level of education by gender
LEvEL of EDuCAtIon totAL 
Male 92
Illiterate 15
Below primary 1
Yet to start 3
Primary (1st to 4th) 11
Middle (5th to 7th) 15
Matriculation/secondary (8th to 10th) 25
High secondary/ intermediate/ pre-university / senior secondary (+1/+2) 7
Technical diploma or certificate not equal to degree 1
Graduate and above 6
DNA 8
Female 100
Illiterate 26
Yet to start 5
Primary (1st to 4th) 9
Middle (5th to 7th) 17
Matriculation/secondary (8th to10th) 21
High secondary/ intermediate/pre-university/ senior secondary (+1/+2) 11
Graduate and above 2
DNA 9
Total 192
The average age of the surveyed sample was 32 and the average number of working members in a HH was two. 
Of the total 55 HHs and 192 family members, 87 were working and 105 were either still pursing education or not 
working. Post relocation, a majority of women were self-employed and most of them either owned a small shop or 
a tailoring unit in the neighbourhood. This was in addition to HH work in the neighbourhood. Very few women were 
involved in daily wage work or were salaried, which was the prominent category of work for men. 
Table A12: Number of HHs by number of working family members 
nuMBER of woRkIng fAMILy MEMBERS kng-f kng-t pMB-f SMy-t totAL
No working members 1 2 2 1 6
Single working 1 5 7 9 22
Two people working 3 7 6 3 19
Three people working 3 1 2 6
Four people working 1 1 2
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Table A13: Type of work by working members by gender
woRk StAtuS, typE of woRk By gEnDER totAL
Male 52
Daily wage/casual labour 24
Regular wage/salaried 23
Self-employed 5
Female 35
Daily wage/casual labour 2
HH work 11
Housewife 3
Regular wage/salaried 3
Self-employed 16
When asked if they or their family members had lost their job after relocation, 20 of them responded yes. 
Table A14: Status of the job post relocation
LoSt joB AftER RELoCAtIon kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Yes 3 6 5 6 20
No 2 9 11 8 30
DNA / NA 1 2 2 5
The three sites of relocation were at least 10–15km away from their previous place of stay. When asked about the 
distances they travelled to reach their workplace, a majority of them said they had to travel long distances after 
relocation. After relocation, 21 of them travelled more than 5km to reach their workplace. 
Table A15: Distance to work place after relocation
DIStAnCE kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Less than 1km 2 1 2 5
1–2km 1 1
2–5km 1 1 5 5 12
More than 5km 1 8 8 4 21
DKCS/DNA/NA 3 5 4 4 16
Table A16: Distance to work place before relocation
DIStAnCE kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
1–2km 1 4 2 2 9
2–5km 1 4 6 4 15
Less than 1km 2 3 6 2 13
More than 5km 1 1 2
DKCS/DNA/NA 1 5 3 7 16
Tables A15 and A16 indicate that most families were living closer to their workplace before relocation. Even though 
the government organised job fairs a few months after the floods, the surveyed families claimed that neither their 
family members nor others they knew in the community got a job. When asked for the reason, they said either the 
jobs required skills that they did not have or that they were too far from their current location. Many of them also 
said that while their phone numbers were taken, no one called back.
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Post-disaster relief
Contrary to social media, news reports, and expert interviews, most of the respondents said that the government 
was the first responder in the case of both the tsunami in 2004 and the floods in 2015. In terms of the relief, 
most people said that money provided post disaster is the most helpful form of relief compared to any other kind. 
However, many news reports and interviews with humanitarian actors reveal that there was political influence 
used for tagging the relief material that was being distributed by other actors post the recent floods. There could 
also be a built-in bias in the responses, if the households being surveyed had some fear or not receiving or hope 
of receiving more government support from/through us (they had not understood that we were independent 
researchers). 
Table A17: First relief providers after tsunami
typE of RESponDERS kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Government 13 10 23
Monetary 11 8 19
With food/clothes 2 2 4
Community/community organisations 3 2 5
With food/clothes 3 2 5
NGO 1 1
With food/clothes 1 1
Other 2 2
Monetary 1 1
With food/clothes 1 1
NA 5 16 1 2 24
Table A18: Type of relief and whether the provided relief was helpful or not
tSunAMI RELIEf-HELpfuL oR not kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Monetary 11 9 20
Yes 11 8 19
No 1 1
With food/clothes 6 5 11
Yes 3 3
No 2 2
DKCS/DNA 3 3 6
NA 5 16 1 2 24
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Table A19: First relief providers after the floods
fIRSt RESponDERS AftER fLooDS kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Government 3 5 3 7 18
Monetary 2 4 2 3 11
With food/clothes 1 1 1 4 7
Community/community organisations 6 2 4 12
Monetary 1 1
With food/clothes 6 2 3 11
NGO 2 4 6
Monetary 1 1
With food/clothes 2 3 5
Other 3 3 6
Monetary 2 1 3
With food/clothes 1 2 3
Did not receive any relief 1 10 2 13
Table A20: Type of relief and whether the provided relief was helpful or not
HELpfuL/not: fLooDS kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Monetary 2 5 4 5 16
Yes 2 5 4 5 16
With food/clothes 3 10 4 9 26
Yes 3 3 2 5 13
No 2 1 3 6
DKCS/DNA 5 1 1 7
Did not receive any relief 1 10 2 13
Work/job opportunities were noted as the most preferred kind of assistance by the families that were relocated 
after the floods, whereas better house and housing was the most preferred assistance by the families that were 
relocated post-tsunami and living in these sites. 
While the families who moved after the tsunami have established their networks and do not have issues with 
regular income opportunities after living for many years in the new sites, they have complained about the poor or 
deteriorated quality of house and facilities. Families that were relocated after the recent floods are comparatively 
happy about their houses, as most of the units are newly constructed and the families feel safe in the relocation 
sites. However, since they moved recently, they still have to travel to their old workplace and complained about lack 
of work opportunities. 
Table A21: Preferred assistance post disaster
pREfERRED ASSIStAnCE kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
House/better housing 1 3 11 9 24
Work 3 10 4 2 19
Money 2 1 3
Food/water/medicines 1 1
Others 1 1 1 3
No assistance needed 5 5
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Long-term implications
When asked if it was their decision to relocate, 39 respondents (18 flood victims and 21 tsunami affected) said 
that they were willing to move there at the time of relocation and 15 of them (of which 11 are tsunami affected living 
in Kannaginagar) said the government or the community influenced/forced them to move to these relocation sites. 
Table A22: Whether relocated on their own or motivated
DECISIon to MovE kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Own decision 4 14 7 14 39
Motivated 1 2 11 1 15
Government 1 2 9 1 13
Other 2 2
DKCS 1 1
There was a very interesting set of responses when asked whether they thought that their life was better in the new 
sites compared to the conditions before, and if they wanted to stay there or go back to their previous locations. 
Of the total 55 respondents, 24 said their life was better in these sites and 31 responded negatively. However, 41 
respondents said that they preferred to go back to their previous location of residence, predominantly for better 
jobs and other facilities. Only a few said they preferred to stay back, of those most are from Semmencherry who 
have lived there for nearly a decade and said they have got used to the life there and had made this their home. Of 
the 24 respondents who said that their life was better now compared to what it was before in terms of housing and 
facilities, etc., 14 of them said they preferred to go back to their previous location. 
Table A23: Quality of life and preference to move back to earlier location
quALIty of LIfE AnD pREfEREnCE to 
MovE
kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Better after relocation 4 4 4 12 24
Go back 3 2 4 5 14
Stay here 1 2 7 10
Better before relocation 1 12 14 4 31
Go back 1 9 14 3 27
Stay here 3 1 4
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Table A24: Reasons to move back and staying in the relocation site
go BACk/StAy HERE – REASonS kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Go back 4 11 18 8 41
Better life and facilities 1 5 3 1 10
For jobs 1 3 6 10
This place is far from the city 1 1 2 4
Unsafe here 1 2 2 5
Only if they give us a house 1 2 3
Community 1 1
DKCS 1 3 3 7
Go back if provided with all facilities 1 1
Stay here 1 5 8 14
Got used to the place / made this home 4 4
No place to go back 2 1 3
Safe here 1 2 1 4
Better life and facilities here 1 1 2
DKCS 1 1
Asset loss
Table A25 indicates the losses experienced during the tsunami. As the families who were staying on the banks 
of the River Adyar did not experience the tsunami, the responders only included tsunami-affected families in the 
relocation sites. 
Table A25: Losses during the tsunami
kInD kng-t SMy-t totAL
Vehicles 1 5 6
IDs and other papers 6 5 11
Shop 3 2 5
Work-related assets 4 4 8
Household assets 9 6 15
Sources of financing 1 4 5
Table A26 indicates the losses experienced by families during floods. This also includes families that were 
relocated after the tsunami, but who have experienced losses in floods.
Table A26: Losses during floods
LoSSES DuRIng fLooDS kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Vehicles 4 1 5
Sources of financing 6 6
Household assets 5 16 2 23
Work-related assets 2 11 2 15
Shop 3 3
IDs and other papers 2 7 2 11
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Table A27 indicates the number of families who lost specified assets in the tsunami and again during the floods. 
Table A27: Losses during tsunami and floods
LoSSES DuRIng BotH tSunAMI AnD 
fLooDS
kng-t SMy-t totAL
IDs and other papers 3 2  5
Work-related assets 1  1
Household assets 3 8 11
Only 7 out of 55 respondents said they had insurance. These had only life insurance, none of them had asset-
related insurance or insurance to cover catastrophes. Monetary assistance/relief provided by the government was 
the only money they had received and none of these losses were recovered. 
Table A28: Number of responders with access to life insurance
StAtuS of InSuRAnCE kng-f kng-t pMB-f SMy-t totAL
Life insurance 1 3 1 2 7
No insurance 4 15 15 14 48
Early warning and preparedness
It was a mixed response when respondents were asked whether they received early warnings of the floods: 24 out 
of 55 respondents said they had received early warnings. While some said they had received early warning a few 
days before the floods, a few said that the government announced a few hours before that the dam gates had been 
opened and that they needed to move out of their houses immediately, leaving them no time to safeguard their 
assets. Some responded that they ignored the warnings, expecting that there would be only a few feet of water and 
didn’t expect this kind of flooding. 
Table A29: Early warning before the floods
fLooDS EARLy wARnIng kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Warning received 4 15 3 2 24
Few hours before 2 6 1 9
Government 2 6 1 9
Few days before 2 7 2 2 13
Government 2 7 1 1 11
TV 1 1 2
DNA 2 2
No warning received 1 1 15 14 31
Nearly half the respondents said that they were better prepared for an extreme event in the future after their past 
experiences. 
Table A30: Preparedness to future extreme events 
BEttER pREpARED tHAn you wERE 
BEfoRE?
kng-f pMB-f kng-t SMy-t totAL
Yes 3 5 11 6 25
No 3 1 2 6
DKCS 2 6 6 7 21
DNA 2 1 3
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Appendix 2: List of key informant interviews
The project team conducted semi-structured interviews with the following individuals: 
REf. 
no.
typE of 
ACtoR
nAME oRgAnISAtIon DAtE/MontH of 
IntERvIEw
1 Activist Nityanand Jayaraman The Vettiver Collective 6 February 2017
2 Academic and 
NGO
Jayshree Vencatesan CARE Earth 7 February 2017
3 NGO Selva AID India February 2017
4 Government Bhuvana Retired Chief Community 
Development Officer, Tamil Nadu 
Slum Clearance Board
8 February 2017
5 NGO Virgil Desai Arunodaya, Kannaginagar 8 February 2017
6 Government Sathyagopal State Disaster Commissioner February 2017
7 NGO Chandramohan and 
Jayaram
Arappor Iyakkam 8 February 2017
8 Activist Revathy Political activist 6 February 2017
9 Academic and 
NGO
Dr Rakhal Gaitonde IIT Madras and SOCHARA 9 February 2017
10 Government Vishwanath Chennai Rivers Restoration Trust February 2017
11 Government Chithra Chennai Metropolitan 
Development Authority
February 2017
12 Government Rosie Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance 
Board
9 February 2017
13 Government Praveen Nair Corporation of Chennai February 2017
14 Private Sector Sridhar CREDAI February 2017
15 NGO Devaneyan Thozhamai February 2017
16 NGO Ameer Khan SOCHARA February 2017
17 Government Suresh Maria Selvam Tsunami Resource Centre February 2017
18 Activist Sujatha Mody Penn Thozhilalar Sangam (a 
labour union)
9 February 2017
19 Government Rajendra Ratnoo Ex-Collector, Director of Municipal 
Services and a senior IAS officer
7 February 2017
20 NGO Latha Subramaniam Bhoomika Trust 7 February 2017
21 NGO Aruna Subramaniam Bhoomika Trust 7 February 2017
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Appendix 3: List of participants at the consultation 
held on 28 February 2017 at the Madras Institute for 
Development Studies, Chennai
nAME oRgAnISAtIon
Ameer Khan Society for Community Health Awareness Research and Action 
(SOCHARA)
Amir Bazaz Indian Institute for Human Settlements
Aruna Subramaniam Bhoomika Trust
Ayushman Banerjee Okapi Research and Advisory
Bhoopati Tamil Nadu Housing Board
Bhuvana R Chief Community Development Officer (Retd.), TNSCB
Chandni Singh Indian Institute for Human Settlements
Chandramohan Arappor Iyakkam
David Sadoway Nanyang Technological University
Ganapathy. G.P. Centre for Disaster Mitigation and Management, VIT University
Garima Jain Indian Institute for Human Settlements
Geetha Ramakrishnan Tamil Nadu Housing Board
Janakarajan S Madras Institute of Development Studies
Jayshree Vencatesan CARE Earth
Karen Coelho Madras Institute of Development Studies
Karine Hochart PhD Student, Anna University
Kavita Wankhade Indian Institute for Human Settlements
Krishna Kumar Okapi Research and Advisory
Latha Subramaniam Bhoomika Trust
Lily Margaret Thozhamai
Nityanand Jayaraman Coastal Resource Center
Praveen P.Nair, IAS Corporation of Chennai
Prithvi Mahadevan WeBe Design Lab
Rajendra Ratnoo, IAS Managing Director, Poompuhar Shipping Corporation Ltd. 
Director, Tamil Nadu Institute of Urban Studies
Rajesh Rangarajan Institute for Financial Management and Research
Revathi R Activist
Rosie Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board
Satyarupa Sekhar Citizen consumer and Civic Action Group
Santha Sheela Nair, IAS Government of Tamil Nadu
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nAME oRgAnISAtIon
Sindhuja Janakiraman Indian Institute for Human Settlements
Sugattho Dutt State Planning Commission
Sujatha Mody Penn Thozhilalar Sangam
Tara Murali Citizen consumer and civic Action Group
Teja Malladi Indian Institute for Human Settlements
Udhaya Rajan WeBe Design Lab
Vanessa Peters Information and Resource Centre for the Deprived Urban Communities
Vidhya Mohankumar Urban Design Collective
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